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“UNFIT TO SERVE” POST-ENRON 
Regina F. Burch* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In what may well be “the biggest case you’ve never heard of[,]” 
former senior executives and directors of now-bankrupt National 
Century Financial Enterprises, Inc. (“NCFE”) allegedly “defrauded 
investors of more than $3 billion.”1  Generally, the alleged fraud involves 
facts now too familiar to the public.  Prior to its bankruptcy, privately 
owned NCFE purchased receivables from healthcare providers to help 
those providers “bridge the gap between when they treated patients and 
when they received payment from private insurance companies, 
Medicare or Medicaid.”2  According to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (“SEC”) complaint, NCFE raised money from investors 
under the condition that the funds were to be used to purchase eligible 
receivables.3  Instead, certain NCFE directors and senior executives used 
the cash to make unsecured loans to distressed and failing healthcare 
providers owned wholly or partly by NCFE or its executives.4  Then, 
NCFE’s management “conspired to conceal cash shortages by shuttling 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law, Capital University School of Law; A.B., Harvard College, 
1986; M.S.A., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 1992; 
J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1999.  The author extends 
thanks to the faculty and administration at Capital University School of Law for research 
support.  In addition, I would like to thank Stefan Padfield and participants in the Ohio 
Legal Scholarship Workshop and in the Midwest People of Color Legal Scholarship 
Conference 2006 Annual Meeting for their thoughtful comments on earlier drafts.  I also 
extend thanks to Tiffany Auvdel, JD ‘07, for her research assistance. 
1 Associated Press, Former Loan Firm Execs in $3 Billion Fraud Case (May 23, 2006), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12932980/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2008).  The Securities and 
Exchange Commission civil complaint alleges that the defendants engaged “in an 
extraordinary scheme to defraud investors who eventually lost approximately $2.6 billion.”  
SEC v. Poulsen, No. 2:05CV1142, 2005 WL 4051274, at Summary ¶ 1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 
2005).  The complex and contentious bankruptcy case involved “the competing 
bankruptcies of over 500 separate medical provider entities in over 2,500 locations, secured 
bondholder claims of over $3.5 billion, and a shortfall of over $2.5 billion in assets.  The 
confirmation hearing was equally complex and contentious.”  Jones Day, Experience Details, 
http://www.jonesday.com/experience/experience_detail.aspx?exID=S321 (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2008). 
2 Associated Press, supra note 1. 
3 See Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274, at Uncollateralized Advances ¶¶ 1-70. 
4 Id. at Summary ¶ 2. 
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money among various subsidiaries[,]” doctoring audit details, and 
falsifying books and records.5 
In a much smaller accounting and financial fraud case involving 
only $19 million, senior executives and directors of publicly-held 
Chancellor Corporation (“Chancellor”), a Massachusetts transportation 
company, allegedly conspired to inflate revenues on its books by 
knowingly and improperly consolidating revenue from a subsidiary over 
which the corporation had no control.6  Chancellor accomplished this by 
reporting fees paid by Chancellor for services not rendered and 
improperly reporting the bogus fees among Chancellor’s assets.7 
The differences between the two cases involved not only the scale of 
the fraud, but also the role played by the defendants in each.  The NCFE 
defendants were management directors; that is, they held senior 
management employee positions within NCFE.8  Allegedly, they 
knowingly participated in the fraud by creating false documents and 
making false oral statements to the public or directing other employees 
to do so.  By contrast, the Chancellor case involved both management 
and non-management directors.9  As with NCFE, Chancellor’s 
management directors knowingly participated in the alleged fraud.  
However, according to the complaint, Chancellor’s non-management 
directors were culpable because they turned a blind eye to the fraud and 
did nothing to prevent or stop the management directors’ fraudulent 
conduct.  In both cases, the SEC sought to bar the defendants from 
serving as officers and directors of any company whose securities are 
registered pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and 
 
5 Associated Press, supra note 1.  See also Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274, at Misleading 
Agreed-Upon Procedures Reports ¶ 148, Defendant Poulsen’s Participation in the Scheme 
to Defraud ¶¶ 154, 158; Jones Day, supra note 1. 
6 SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 1:03-CV-10762, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶¶ 1-8 (D. Mass. 
Apr. 24, 2003). 
7 Id. 
8 See Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274, at ¶¶ 7-10. 
9 Chancellor Corp., 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶¶ 12-21.  This Article borrows the term “[n]on-
[m]anagement [d]irector” from a recent article by Donald C. Clarke describing how courts 
and commentators use different terminology, such as “independent,” “disinterested[,]” 
“non-executive,” and “non-employee,” to distinguish between inside and outside directors.  
See Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73, 78-79 
(2007).  Non-management directors do not hold executive positions within the corporation.  
Id. at 79.  Non-management directors are often senior executives at other corporations, 
public sector employees who are influential in political circles, in some other way 
influential in the corporation’s business, well-regarded academics, or former or current 
counsel to the corporation.  Id. 
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), among other 
remedies.10 
Section 305(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOA”) authorized 
the SEC to bar: 
any person who violated section 10(b) [of the Securities 
Exchange Act] or the rules or regulations thereunder 
from acting as an officer or director of any issuer [of a 
publicly-traded or registered security] . . . if the person’s 
conduct demonstrates unfitness to serve as an officer or 
director of any such issuer.11 
 
10 See Chancellor Corp., 2003 WL 23885225, at Prayer for Relief; Poulsen, 2005 WL 4051274, 
at Prayer for Relief.  See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000); 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2000). 
11 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21(d)(2), 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78u(d)(2) (2000)).  In addition to providing for bar orders on a showing of unfitness under 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 [hereinafter “Exchange Act”], the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also authorized the SEC to prohibit an individual from serving 
as an officer and director if the person violates the Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 17(a)(1), 
48 Stat. 74 [hereinafter “Securities Act”], the provision prohibiting fraud in the offer or sale 
of securities, or its rules and regulations.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 1105(b), P.L. 107-
204, 116 Stat. 745, 780 (2002) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77h-1(f) (2000)).  The SEC 
now can issue these orders in an administrative proceeding on a showing of unfitness, in 
contrast to the earlier standard, substantial unfitness.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2) (2000).  
Courts have used Professor Jayne Barnard’s suggested factors to determine whether an 
executive should be barred because the executive is substantially unfit to serve.  See, e.g., 
SEC v. Shah, No. 92-CIV 1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993) (discussing 
and applying Professor Barnard’s factors, including: “(1) the ‘egregiousness’ of the 
underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant’s ‘repeat offender’ status; (3) the 
defendant’s ‘role’ or position when he engaged in the fraud; (4) the defendant’s degree of 
scienter; (5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that 
misconduct will recur”); SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Jayne W. Barnard, 
When is a Corporate Executive “Substantially Unfit to Serve?”, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1489, 1510-22 
(1992) (proposing a factor test used by federal courts to determine whether a bar order is an 
appropriate remedy); Jayne W. Barnard, The SEC’s Suspension and Bar Powers in Perspective, 
76 TUL. L. REV. 1253, 1259 (2002) (describing courts’ use of her proposed factors).  Although 
the standard under SOA has changed from “substantial unfitness” to “unfitness,” courts 
have continued to use the tests developed under the previous standard.  Stephen J. 
Crimmins, Where are We Going with SEC Officer and Director Bars?, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 
717, 718 (2006).  However, these tests may result in liability in under more limited 
circumstances than Congress intended.  See infra Section V.D; see also Thomas O. Gorman & 
Heather J.Stewart, Is There a New Sheriff in Corporateville?  The Obligations of Directors, 
Officers, Accountants, and Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 135, 148 (2004).  
But see Jayne W. Barnard, SEC Debarment of Officers and Directors After Sarbanes-Oxley, 59 
BUS. LAW. 391, 414-17 (2004) (describing the “[i]nherent [i]llegitimacy of a [l]ifetime [b]ar 
[o]rder.”). 
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This Article proposes that both management and non-management 
directors who knowingly or recklessly engage in accounting and 
financial fraud are unfit to serve and should be barred from serving as 
officers and directors of publicly traded corporations.  Moreover, 
directors who knowingly or recklessly fail to halt or disclose accounting 
fraud and similar unlawful behavior should be temporarily or 
permanently barred from serving as officers or directors of public 
corporations.  In particular, this article proposes that non-management 
directors’ reckless failures to respond to red flags may amount to an 
intentional omission of material information and violate the Securities 
Exchange Act, Section 10(b), among other federal laws.12 
It may be well accepted that willful accounting fraud violates 
specific provisions of the federal securities laws.  Also, it may not be 
controversial that executives who fail to respond to red flags indicating 
accounting fraud may be found to have violated the federal securities 
laws.  More controversial is that such executives—both management and 
non-management directors—may be found unfit to serve as officers and 
directors of public corporations and may be permanently barred from 
service. 
Accounting fraud may be the most pervasive type of fraud infecting 
modern corporations.  As demonstrated by NCFE and Chancellor, such 
schemes may be facilitated by management directors and senior 
executives who know how to hide fraud within the camouflage of 
legitimate transactions, by non-management directors who fail to 
investigate obvious red flags, by ineffective internal control systems, and 
by accountants, lawyers, bankers, and analysts who are captured by their 
 
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000).  Under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, it is unlawful: 
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security 
not so registered . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the 
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public 
interest or for the protection of investors. 
Id.  Likewise, Rule 10b-5 prohibits: 
[the] [e]mployment of manipulative and deceptive devices. . . . (a) 
To . . . defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or 
to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the 
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they 
were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or 
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or 
deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
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clients.13  Executives who know of accounting fraud and take no steps to 
prevent the fraud may be liable for violating fiduciary duties as set forth 
in state corporation statutes or for violating disclosure requirements as 
set forth in federal securities law.14  However, executives who recklessly 
ignore signs of accounting fraud may not be liable under state or federal 
law unless it can be shown that those executives should have known of 
the red flags and that their failure to know demonstrates an egregious 
lapse of care under state law standards or violates antifraud provisions 
under federal securities law. 
It has been very difficult under both federal securities laws and state 
laws to hold executives responsible for accounting fraud or for aiding 
and abetting such fraud, although recent successes have been achieved.  
Federal criminal trials for violations of federal securities laws are 
lengthy, involve large resource expenditures by government prosecutors, 
require sifting through thousands of pages of corporate documents, and 
involve many corporate employees and other individuals.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which has exclusive authority over 
criminal enforcement of federal securities laws, must show that the 
defendant acted willfully or knowingly and must establish its case by 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.15  Under these circumstances, “it is 
invariably very difficult to assign individual fault.”16 
Also, private plaintiffs’ ability to enforce federal securities laws in 
state court is constrained by federal legislation—including the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),17 the Securities 
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (“SLUSA”),18 and the National 
 
13 Capture occurs when third party gatekeepers self-identify with issuers and 
management and are thus unable to render an unbiased opinion regarding the truthfulness 
and fairness of such issuer’s financial statements. 
14 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 750 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 
A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (finding that liability may result from egregious lapses in duty to 
monitor).  See infra Part IV for the proposition that non-management directors may be 
liable under federal law. 
15 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of Criminal Law in 
Preventing Corporate Crime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937 (2003) (discussing recent Department of 
Justice successes in criminal enforcement actions). 
16 Dale A. Oesterle, Early Observations on the Prosecutions of the Business Scandals of 2002-
03: On Sideshow Prosecutions, Spitzer’s Clash with Donaldson over Turf, The Choice of Civil or 
Criminal Actions, and the Tough Tactic of Coerced Cooperation, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 443, 446 
(2004). 
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1, 77z-2, 78j-1, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2000). 
18 15 U.S.C. § 78a (2000); see Pub. L. No. 105-353, Tit. 1, § 101(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3227 (1998); 
Securities Act § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) (2000); Exchange Act § 28(f)(1), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78bb(f)(1) (Supp. 2002). 
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Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”)19—each passed 
during the Clinton administration.20  Private plaintiffs in state court also 
face difficulty as a result of procedural and substantive hurdles, 
including the business judgment rule and the derivative lawsuit demand 
requirement, combined with protections afforded by directors’ and 
officers’ liability insurance.21  State Attorneys General confront many of 
the same problems in proving the fraud as those faced by federal 
prosecutors.  Moreover, resource constraints may affect state attorneys 
even more severely than federal attorneys.   Also, the SEC—which has 
the power to adopt rules to implement the federal securities laws, to 
bring and to judge administrative proceedings against violators of such 
rules, and to initiate enforcement actions in federal court—has 
traditionally had limited options for prosecuting fraudulent financial 
reporting.22  More recently, Congress provided the SEC with additional 
resources and additional enforcement tools in the SOA.  Most 
significantly, Congress gave the SEC the power to permanently bar 
persons from serving as officers or directors of publicly-traded 
corporations in administrative proceedings or to seek a court-ordered 
bar upon a showing of unfitness.23 
 
19 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm, 80b-3a. (2000). 
20 The PSLRA, specifically, was enacted by a substantial, bipartisan Congressional vote 
over President Clinton’s veto. 
21 See Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1074-76 (2006); 
Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 BUS. LAW. 1375, 1388 (2006) 
(describing reasons why independent director liability in private plaintiff lawsuits is rare). 
22 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomson, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical 
Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 747 (2003).  Before the 1990 legislation, the SEC’s options for 
prosecuting such violations were extremely limited: the SEC could initiate an injunctive 
action in federal court.  See 104 Stat. at 931 (enacted “[t]o amend the Federal securities laws 
in order to provide additional enforcement remedies for violations of those laws”).  If the 
misleading item appeared in a report required to be filed with the SEC, the SEC could 
bring an administrative action under Section 15(c)(4) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(c)(4).  However, the 15(c)(4) administrative remedy arguably was limited to requiring 
the registrant to correct its filing.  A somewhat more sweeping administrative sanction 
existed under the Securities Act in the form of a stop order or refusal order when a 
registration statement filed with the SEC was believed to be materially misleading.  More 
frequently, the SEC resorted to negotiations with the offending parties that culminated in a 
settlement embodied in a report of the results of its investigation as authorized by Section 
21(a) of the Exchange Act.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (2000) (authorizing the SEC to make 
investigations into possible violations and to publish its findings). 
23 Previously, the SEC could seek a bar only upon a showing of substantial unfitness and 
only in a federal district court proceeding.  See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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This Article argues that the SEC should vigorously pursue fraud 
actions against corporate directors who fall “asleep at the switch[.]”24  
Moreover, the SEC should forcefully exercise its regulatory authority to 
find such directors unfit and permanently bar these directors from 
service.  Enforcement actions of this type may be one means to deter the 
accounting and financial fraud of the type exemplified by Enron, Tyco, 
WorldCom, and others at the start of this century.  Factors that deter 
accounting fraud include the fear of getting caught, the likelihood of 
getting caught, the belief that the behavior is criminal or illegal, and the 
resources available for enforcement against white collar accounting 
fraud.  While the Securities Act, Exchange Act, and SOA (or for that 
matter any combination of legal regulation) alone will not prevent fraud, 
many agree that legal regulation—and the actors who enforce the legal 
rules, particularly the SEC—combined with market regulation and other 
factors that influence behavioral norms, are strong tools to uncover fraud 
and enforce fair play in the securities market. 
Also, falling asleep at the switch harms corporations, shareholders, 
the public at large, and the economy in general.25  Public confidence in 
the securities markets reached a low point after the revelation of 
accounting and financial frauds at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and more.26  
The stock market experienced steep drops, some believe due to the wave 
of accounting restatements and consequent loss in investor confidence.  
In April, 2007, the market capitalization27 of corporations publicly-traded 
on United States stock exchanges accounted for $19.640 trillion, while 
total global market capitalization was around $50 trillion.28  In other 
words, publicly-traded U.S. corporations made up approximately forty 
percent of global market capitalization.29  Investment in the securities of 
such corporations accounted for approximately “[forty-five] percent of 
 
24 Otis Bilodeau, SEC to Go After Directors Who Ignore Fraud; Case Against Former Outside 
Board Member of Firm Will Be Model, CHI. SUN TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003. 
25 Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced 
Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2002). 
26 Id. at 10. 
27 Market capitalization is a measure of how much money is invested in a particular firm 
and is based on the number of shares of a firm multiplied by the share price.  For example, 
a firm with 100 shares total in the hands of its investors, each share worth $10, has a market 
capitalization of $1000. 
28 WORLD FEDERATION OF EXCHANGES, Domestic Market Capitalization, March 5, 2007, 
http://www.world-exchanges.org/WFE/home.asp?menu=406&document=4140 (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
29 Forty percent is calculated by dividing U.S. gross domestic product by global gross 
domestic product. 
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the value of equities traded worldwide.”30  Global gross domestic 
product approximated $44 trillion, and United States gross domestic 
product accounted for approximately nineteen percent of global gross 
domestic product.31  Clearly, the economic health of corporations (and 
transparency into the economic condition of corporations) is essential to 
smooth functioning of the United States economy, if not the world 
economy.  “[The] U.S. sneezes and [the] world catches cold[.]”32 
Moreover, while directors are not responsible for the details of 
corporate operations, they should be responsible for being aware of 
those operations to the extent that red flags regarding accounting fraud 
are recognized and addressed.  Management directors who hold 
positions of responsibility within a company may face increased risk of 
liability post-SOA, but are not (and should not be) solely responsible for 
the activities of the business.33  Management and non-management 
directors share corporate monitoring responsibilities.  In fact, under 
director independence requirements in federal regulation, non-
management directors may be expected to diligently monitor 
management directors’ activities.  SOA does not include an express 
remedy if directors fail in their oversight and monitoring duties and as a 
result fail to disclose truthful, material information in financial 
statements or fail to ensure that such information is disclosed.  Instead, 
this gap may be filled by the SEC under its power to enforce specific 
antifraud provisions in the securities laws. 
 
30 Glen Yago et al., Home Bias in Global Capital Markets: What is the Potential Demand for 
U.S. Asset-Backed Securities?, MILKEN INST. 1 (2006); Rick Newman, Five Reasons Foreign 
Money Boosts the U.S. Economy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 11, 2008, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/blogs/flowchart/2008/1/11/five-reasons-foreign-money-
boosts-the-us-economy.html. 
31 Global Stock Values Top $50 Trln: Industry Data, REUTERS (London), Mar. 21, 2007, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2144839620070321 (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
32 Michael R. Sesit, Around the Markets: U.S. Sneezes and World Catches Cold, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Sept. 18, 2006, available at 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/17/bloomberg/bxatm.php.  See also Sergery 
Minaev, The U.S. Economy Sneezes: Dollar Takes a Nosedive, INTELLIBRIEFS, Apr. 16, 2007, 
available at http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2007/04/us-economy-sneezes-dollar-
takes.html; Michael Chriszt, U.S. Sneezes, World Catches Cold, ECONSOUTH, 2d Qtr. 2001, 
available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke.cfm?objectid=87B67B00-6666-11D5-
93390020352A7A95&method=display.  But see Tony Lopez, When the U.S. Sneezes, the World 
Doesn’t Care, THE MANILA TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, available at 
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2007/apr/17/yehey/opinion/20070417opi6.html 
(listing a number of reasons why the world will not catch a cold, and the Philippines will 
not catch pneumonia, from the U.S. economy’s latest sneeze). 
33 Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?  Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty 
Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 455 (2005). 
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This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II briefly overviews the duty 
to monitor defined in state and federal law.  Part III discusses 
management directors’ fraud, and how and why these directors’ failures 
to monitor and to investigate corporate operations may amount to 
misrepresentations and omissions of financial information in violation of 
Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act.  Moreover, it discusses 
how management executives may be and have been found unfit to serve 
when their conduct meets certain criteria.  Further, it discusses the 
criteria used to determine whether they should be barred from serving as 
officers and directors.  Part IV discusses non-management directors’ 
failure to monitor and whether failure to monitor amounts to a 
misrepresentation or omission in violation of Section 10(b).  It considers 
factors a court should examine to determine whether a non-management 
violator should be found unfit to serve and the criteria a court should 
consider to determine that a bar order is the appropriate remedy. 
Part V considers challenges and policy issues that may arise.  First, it 
discusses why, although they are unlikely to succeed, opponents may 
bring constitutional challenges.  Second, the Part discusses the standard 
of proof for the underlying violation, the unfitness issue, and whether a 
bar order is the appropriate remedy.  Third, Part V considers the nature 
of the incentives that such SEC action would create.  Fourth, the Part 
discusses whether the SEC is fit to serve in this role of overseer and 
enforcer.  Finally, Part V addresses the criticisms that the SEC is unlikely 
to fully exercise its powers to bar directors and that the SEC should not 
use its administrative powers to create a de facto federal common law 
duty of care.  The Article concludes in Part VI. 
II.  THE DUTY TO MONITOR AND INVESTIGATE 
A. Duty to Monitor and Investigate Under State Law 
The duty of care and the duty of loyalty have been described as the 
traditional fiduciary duties owed by directors to the corporation.34   Also, 
it is well settled that a director’s duty of care includes the duty to 
 
34 See William F. Kennedy, The Standard of Responsibility for Directors, 52 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 624, 628 (1985); see also William T. Allen, The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary Duty of Care 
and the Business Judgment Rule Under U.S. Corporate Law, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE: THE STATE OF THE ART AND EMERGING RESEARCH 307, 315 (Klaus J. Hopt et 
al. eds., 1998). 
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monitor and oversee corporate activities,35 as well as the duty to remain 
informed about the corporation,36 the duty to regularly review financial 
statements and devote attention to board duties,37 and the duty to 
inquire into corporate affairs.38  Aspirational standards of director 
conduct traditionally are defined by legally binding case law and 
statutes and by non-binding standards of business best practice.39 
Two distinct factual situations give rise to the duty to monitor.40  The 
first factual scenario involves a board decision regarding a specific 
transaction.  Directors are expected to employ a reasonable decision-
making process, i.e., one that was “either deliberately considered in good 
faith or [that] was otherwise rational[,]” and to act in the good faith 
pursuit of corporate, not personal, interests.41  The second factual 
scenario involves circumstances “in which a loss eventuates not from a 
decision but[] from unconsidered inaction.”42  For example, the Model 
Business Corporation Act, Section 8.30(b), Comment 2, specifies that: 
The standard of care associated with the oversight 
function involves gaining assurances from management 
and advisers that systems believed appropriate have 
been established coupled with ongoing monitoring of 
the systems in place, such as those concerned with legal 
compliance or internal controls—followed up with a 
proactive response when alerted to the need for 
inquiry.43 
Further, “[t]he phrase ‘devoting attention,’ in the context of the oversight 
function, refers to concern with the corporation’s information and 
 
35 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822 (N.J. 1981).  But see Guttman v. 
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that the duty to monitor stems from the 
duties of care and loyalty). 
36 Francis, 432 A.2d at 822; see also MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(a), cmt. 1 (2005). 
37 Francis, 432 A.2d at 822. 
38 Id. 
39 Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000).  The exact behavior required of 
directors in carefully monitoring and overseeing corporate activities will vary depending 
on the circumstances. 
40 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
41 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
42 Id. at 968. 
43 MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30(b), cmt. 2 (2005). 
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reporting systems and not to proactive inquiry searching out system 
inadequacies or noncompliance.”44 
Three Delaware state court cases provide greater specificity to 
behavior required of directors engaged in overseeing general corporate 
operations.  Two cases, Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.45 and In re 
Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,46 detail a corporate 
director’s responsibility to ensure that the appropriate systems indeed 
have been established and are providing timely, material information 
about the corporation’s business performance and compliance with legal 
requirements. 
Graham involved a claim that, as early as 1943, Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Company directors were aware of Federal Trade 
Commission consent decrees and alerted to alleged antitrust violations 
within the company.  The plaintiffs claimed that the consent decrees put 
the directors on notice of alleged illegal activity within the company and 
that the directors should have taken steps to learn about ongoing 
antitrust violations in the company and prevent future antitrust 
violations from occurring in 1956, by which time at least three directors 
were aware of the consent decrees against Allis-Chalmers.47  These 
directors, after conducting a limited investigation in 1943 and after 
consulting with legal counsel, concluded that the company had never 
been involved in antitrust violations.48  The Delaware Supreme Court 
held that even though the directors knew of the 1937 consent decrees, 
and thus had notice of possible illegal activity in 1937, such notice was 
not sufficient notice of future illegal activity in 1956.49  More importantly, 
the court found that without notice of possible illegal activity, the 
directors had no duty to put into place “a system of watchfulness which 
would have brought such misconduct to [the board’s] attention in ample 
time to have brought it to an end[]” and “no duty . . . to . . . ferret out 
wrongdoing which [the board had] no reason to suspect exists.”50 
Recently, Graham was interpreted to hold that liability for a breach of 
the duty to monitor should be imposed only when the directors had 
 
44 Id.  Twenty-nine states have adopted the MBCA in whole or in part.  Id. at xix.  A 
significant number of additional states’ corporate codes are based on the MBCA.  Id. 
45 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
46 698 A.2d at 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
47 Graham, 188 A.2d at 129. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 130. 
50 Id. 
Burch: "Unfit to Serve" Post-Enron
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
1092 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
actual or constructive notice of potential wrongdoing within their own 
organizations.51  A broader reading of Graham—that directors need not 
put in place information gathering and reporting systems regarding the 
corporation’s compliance with law—was rejected in Caremark. 
In Caremark, plaintiffs claimed that the directors knew uncertainty 
existed about the interpretation of the Anti-Referral Payments Law 
(“ARPL”), a law prohibiting healthcare providers from paying 
“kickbacks” to induce the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients.  
Further, they claimed the directors should have known that certain 
Caremark officers and employees were violating the ARPL, that the 
directors failed to stop the illegal activities, and that the directors thus 
breached their fiduciary duty to pay attention and “to be active monitors 
of corporate performance.”52  Essentially, the plaintiffs claimed that the 
directors failed to have effective information gathering and reporting 
systems in place.53  The Chancery Court interpreted Graham “as standing 
for the proposition that, absent grounds to suspect deception, neither 
corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with wrongdoing 
simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the honesty of their 
dealings on the company’s behalf.”54  Also, the court opined that 
corporate boards should: 
assur[e] themselves that information and reporting 
systems exist in the organization that are reasonably 
designed to provide to senior management and to the 
 
51 In re Abbott Labs. Derivative S’holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 809 (7th Cir. 2003); McCall 
v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 818 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Baxter Int’l S’holers Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 
1270-71 (Del. Ch. 1995); In re Illinois Valley Acceptance Corp., 531 F. Supp. 737, 741 (C.D. 
Ill. 1982). 
52 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
53 See generally id.  The essence of a Caremark claim is that directors breached their duty 
of care by failing to put in place effective information and reporting systems.  In contrast, 
the basis of a Graham claim is that the breach of duty arose from the failure to take 
appropriate action to respond to red flags signaling obvious wrongdoing in the 
corporation.  Some courts take the view that failure to respond to known red flags rises to 
the level of a sustained and systematic failure to exercise oversight, and states a claim 
under Caremark.  For example, in Abbott Labs, the plaintiffs alleged a failure by the directors 
to take action in light of the red flags generated by internal controls and external sources.  
Abbott Labs, 325 F.3d at 802 (7th Cir. 2003); see also Scott, 239 F.3d at 816 (where plaintiffs 
claimed that the corporation’s internal audit staff informed the Board’s Audit Committee 
about red flags); Benjamin v. Kim, No. 95 Civ. 9597 (LMM), 1999 WL 249706, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 28, 1999) (in which a sole shareholder and co-CEO of the company informed director-
defendant of the existence of several serious red flags); Eric Landau, Shawn Harpen & 
Kristel A. Massey, Revisiting Caremark and a Director’s Duty to Monitor: The Chancery Court’s 
Wake-up Call to Directors, 1418 PLI/CORP 37, 52 (2004). 
54 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969. 
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board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to 
allow management and the board, each within its scope, 
to reach informed judgments concerning both the 
corporation’s compliance with law and its business 
performance.55 
The Caremark board, in good faith, had implemented internal controls; 
the fault lay with employees who lacked integrity. 
After Graham and Caremark, a director’s duty to exercise appropriate 
attention includes a duty to oversee the implementation of reasonable 
information and reporting systems and to inquire into red flags.56  A 
more recent case, Beam ex. rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc., 
further defines the duty to monitor, holding that the duty does not create 
a requirement for corporate boards to monitor directors’ personal 
affairs.57 
In order to state a claim for breach of oversight, the plaintiff must 
allege facts that show: 
(1) that the directors knew or (2) should have known 
that violations of law were occurring and, in either 
event, (3) that the directors took no steps in a good faith 
effort to prevent or remedy that situation, and (4) that 
such failure proximately resulted in the losses 
complained of . . . .58 
If plaintiffs prove that directors became aware of red flags generated by 
the internal controls or otherwise and took no action, then liability 
should follow.59  However, in the absence of adequate proof of red flags 
known to the board, plaintiffs must show “a sustained or systematic 
 
55 Id. at 970.  The design and implementation of internal controls and information 
systems is within the board’s business discretion. 
56 Salsitz v. Nasser, 208 F.R.D. 589, 592 (E.D. Mich. 2002); In re Citigroup Inc. S’holders 
Litig., No. 19827, 2003 WL 21384599, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 5, 2003). 
57 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 975-76 
(Del. Ch. 2003), aff’d, 845 A.2d 1040 (Del. 2004). 
58 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971; see also Stewart, 833 A.2d at 976 (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d 
at 971); Canadian Commercial Workers Indus. Pension Plan v. Alden, 2006 WL 456786, at 
*6 (Del. Ch. Feb. 22, 2006). 
59 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. 1963); see also Caremark, 
698 A.2d at 970. 
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failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . .”60  For example, evidence 
demonstrating: 
an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable 
information and reporting system exits [sic] []will 
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary 
condition to liability.  Such a test of liability—lack of 
good faith as evidenced by sustained or systematic 
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight—is 
quite high.61 
Caremark duties implicate the duty of loyalty (and good faith, either 
subsumed within the duty of loyalty or as a separate duty) as well as the 
duty of care.  In Guttman v. Huang, the Chancery Court stated: 
Although the Caremark decision is rightly seen as a prod 
towards the greater exercise of care by directors in 
monitoring their corporations’ compliance with legal 
standards, by its plain and intentional terms, the opinion 
articulates a standard for liability for failures of 
oversight that requires a showing that the directors 
breached their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to 
their duties in good faith.62 
Therefore, Caremark claims are not precluded by the Delaware General 
Corporations Code, Section 102(b)(7)’s exculpatory charter provisions.  
Generally, Section 102(b)(7) charter provisions—and similar provisions 
authorized under other state statutes—may be adopted by corporations 
to relieve directors of personal liability for breaches of due care.  The 
provisions do not relieve directors of liability for breaches of the duty of 
loyalty nor for acts not in good faith.63 
Cases in which directors were found to have breached their 
oversight and monitoring duties are few and far between.64  First, the 
presence of internal monitoring and control systems may be evidence 
that directors have not systematically and utterly failed to monitor 
 
60 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971. 
61 Id. 
62 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
63 Alden, 2006 WL 456786, at *6 (“[I]f the Amended Complaint adequately states a 
Caremark claim, the stated claim necessarily falls outside the liability waiver provided by 
[the corporation’s] 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter provision.”). 
64 See Fairfax, supra note 33, at 408-14. 
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corporate activities.  Second, the fact that directors were unaware of red 
flags, despite the existence of internal monitoring and control systems, 
simply may be evidence of the lack of integrity of certain employees who 
engaged in illegal activities and the deftness with which those employees 
hid their illegal activities.  Unawareness of red flags, in and of itself, may 
not create a reasonable inference that directors consciously abdicated 
their monitoring duties or that the systems were not reasonably designed 
to provide timely information to the board.  Third, directors, with the 
possible exception of the chief executive officer and the chief financial 
officer, have no state law duty to inquire into the day-to-day operations 
of the corporation and no duty to investigate whether internal controls 
are effective at an operational level, so long as the internal controls are in 
place and directors are not put on notice that the internal controls are not 
working.65 
While Caremark provides an incentive for corporations to implement 
internal controls and allows for the fact that there are an infinite number 
of flags that directors might look into, one drawback to the Caremark test 
is that it provides no incentive for directors to probe and ask questions.66  
Consequently, unreported illegal behavior remains unreported, and 
corporations may develop a “don’t ask, don’t tell[]” culture.67 
In sum, egregious lapses in oversight—either through conscious 
disregard of red flags or ongoing inattention to internal controls, red 
flags, and information generated by the controls—may lead to liability.  
“[D]irectors cannot ignore red flags generated by internal control 
systems if those red flags are numerous, serious, directly in front of the 
directors, and indicative of a corporate-wide problem.”68 
B. Duty to Monitor and Investigate Under Federal Law 
Some scholars see a recent Delaware Supreme Court case as 
revealing that even in this post-Enron era of heightened liability under 
securities laws and higher federalized standards of corporate governance 
under SOA, there is no change in a director’s liability in state court for 
 
65 See Lois F. Herzeca & Angelique Mamby, Evolving Standards for Director Reliance, 7 No. 
8 THE M&A LAWYER 18, 18 (Feb. 2004); see also Regina F. Burch, Director Oversight and 
Monitoring: The Standard of Care and the Standard of Liability Post-Enron, 6 WYO. L. REV. 481, 
498 (2006). 
66 Burch, supra note 65, at 502. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 498. 
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failure to implement corporate governance best practices.69  Federal law 
may define standards of care to some degree; however, the fiduciary 
duty and standards governing board behavior mostly have been—and 
remain—areas reserved to state law.  For example, SOA appears to 
model federal law based on Caremark, although explicit monitoring 
responsibilities are more limited under federal law than under state law.  
SOA Section 302, for instance, requires that the audit committee establish 
internal complaint systems, designed to “alert the audit committee to 
potential problems before they have serious consequences.”70  Also, it 
appears that audit committees bear the responsibility for initiating and 
following through on investigations and that such investigations must 
come from the top-down instead of from the bottom-up.71 
Further, the rules promulgated under SOA define the tests to 
determine if internal controls are operating effectively.72  While the 
design of internal controls is still within the board’s discretion, the 
internal controls must be able to identify “significant deficiencies” and 
“material weaknesses”73 and the controls themselves must be tested to 
determine if they operate as required.74  In addition, SOA Section 302 
places the responsibility for establishing and maintaining internal 
controls and ensuring that the internal controls effectively provide 
material financial and accounting information to corporate management 
squarely on the principal executive and financial officers of the 
corporation.75  The chief executive officer and chief financial officer must 
 
69 In a recent interview for the Corporate Accountability Report, Ottilie L. Jarmel 
expressed the widespread view that Chancellor William B. Chandler’s decision in Walt 
Disney indicates directors will not be liable for breach of fiduciary duty for failing to 
integrate corporate best practices into decision-making.  BNA CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 
REP., vol. 3, No. 38, at 945 (Sept. 30, 2005) (“[F]iduciary duties don’t change, even when 
aspirational best practices do[] . . . .”).  I take the view that there will be increased focus on 
board actions as federal reforms redefine industry standards for good corporate behavior.  
See Burch, supra note 65, at 502-03 (asserting that federal reforms will redefine industry 
standards that influence the standard of care applied by state courts in breach of due care 
cases).  Although securities law claims by state prosecutors recently have had a measure of 
success, these enforcement actions are relatively new.  Spitzer may be the most notable 
example.  See Oesterle, supra note 16, at 459-60. 
70 Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, Release No. 33-8220, § II(C) 
(Apr. 9, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm; see 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7241 (2000). 
71 Burch, supra note 65, at 506-07. 
72 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. 2003)). 
73 Id. at § 302(a)(6). 
74 Id. at § 302(a)(4)(C). 
75 Id. at § 302(a)(4). 
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certify in periodic financial reports to the SEC that the internal controls 
are in place and are operating effectively.76  However, the SEC’s release 
accompanying the rules that implement Section 302 notes that overall 
responsibility for overseeing management’s design and maintenance of 
internal controls remains with the corporation’s board of directors.  As a 
result, SOA may stimulate the questioning that may be missing in a 
“don’t ask, don’t tell” environment. 
Irrespective of arguments that federal securities disclosure 
requirements “create incentives for specific corporate action[]” by, for 
example, requiring detailed disclosure of “various corporate systems or 
plans[]” or an explanation of why the systems or plans are not in place, 
an explicit federal law cause of action for failure to oversee and monitor 
does not exist in SOA.77  Furthermore, SOA’s legislative history does not 
directly address director oversight and monitoring standards.  In SOA, 
Congress had the opportunity to go further than it had in the past in 
allowing the SEC to set a federal standard of care (simply by seeking 
liability against directors for certain actions), either by writing a standard 
of care into the statute and then allowing the SEC to enforce it, or by 
allowing the SEC to create a standard of care under its rule-making 
authority and then enforcing that new standard.  While the lack of 
Congressional action may be viewed as a deliberate decision not to 
intrude on law traditionally relegated to the states, it may also be viewed 
as the result of the haste with which Congress enacted SOA.  Moreover, 
it may be viewed as an implicit satisfaction with, and deference to, the 
SEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory powers prior to SOA and to judicial 
review of the SEC’s exercise of its powers.  If Congress is dissatisfied 
with the SEC’s exercise of its enforcement powers post-SOA, then 
Congress can amend SOA, even though, prior to SOA, Congress was less 
active than the SEC and the courts in this area. 
III.  BARS AGAINST MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS FOR FAILURE TO MONITOR 
AND INVESTIGATE 
In order for the SEC to bar directors through an administrative 
proceeding or to seek a court-ordered bar for failure to monitor and 
oversee corporate operations, three things must happen: (1) the SEC 
must prove that failure to monitor and oversee corporate operations 
violated Exchange Act Section 10(b) and/or Securities Act Section 
17(a)(2); (2) the SEC or a court must determine that the defendant is unfit 
 
76 Id. at § 302(a). 
77 Sale, supra note 21, at 1380. 
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to serve as an officer or director of a publicly-traded company; and (3) 
the SEC or a court must determine whether a temporary or permanent 
bar is the appropriate remedy.78 
As described above, both management and non-management 
directors have a duty to monitor and oversee corporate operations.79  
This Part describes typical scenarios in which management directors 
were found to be unfit and barred from serving as officers and directors 
as well as how their behavior violated Sections 10(b) and 17(a)(2).  
Furthermore, this Part discusses the factors the SEC and courts may use 
to determine whether the defendants are unfit to serve and to impose a 
temporary or permanent bar.  Part IV then addresses the circumstances 
under which non-management directors might be barred from serving as 
officers and directors. 
A. Typical Underlying Offenses and Statutes Implicated 
To successfully state a civil claim under Rule 10b-5, four elements 
must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.80  First, the alleged 
 
78 See SEC v. Shah, No. 92-CIV 1952, 1993 WL 288285, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1993) 
(explaining that a court may impose a bar order on a showing that defendant violated 
either Securities Act Section 17(a)(1) or Exchange Act Section 10(b) and that, based on the 
defendant’s conduct, the defendant is substantially unfit to serve as an officer or director of 
a publicly-traded corporation); see also Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the Unfitness 
Question, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 43-44 (2005) (discussing the three elements in the context of 
defining the operative burden of proof); 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(2) 
(2000); supra note 12. 
79 See supra notes 12-14, 33, and accompanying text; supra Part II and accompanying text.  
Some courts and commentators suggest that management directors are subject to a 
heightened duty to monitor because they are more familiar with corporate operations.  See, 
e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 888-89 (Del. 1985) (noting a heightened state law-
based fiduciary duty of care applied to management directors); Feir v. Leasco Data 
Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 577-78 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).  What constitutes 
“reasonable investigation” into the accuracy and completeness of data included in a 
registration statement: 
will vary with the degree of involvement of the individual [in the 
statement’s preparation], his expertise, and his access to the pertinent 
information and data . . . Inside directors with intimate knowledge of 
corporate affairs and of the particular transactions will be expected to 
make a more complete investigation and have more extensive 
knowledge of facts supporting or contradicting inclusions in the 
registration statements than outside directors. 
Feir, 332 F. Supp. at 577-78; see also, e.g., Goldstein v. Alodex Corp., 409 F. Supp. 1201, 1203 
n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (reasoning that a management director would have more extensive 
knowledge of the facts than a non-management director, and “each must undertake that 
investigation which a reasonable prudent man in that position would conduct”). 
80 See supra note 12 (quoting Rule 10b-5); infra Part V.B. 
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violation must involve an “instrumentality of interstate commerce[.]”81  
This element is satisfied when a corporation’s security is traded over the 
national securities exchanges, because such trading necessarily involves 
the use of interstate commerce—telephone, email, or posted mail.  
Second, the violation must be “in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.”82  This element is construed broadly.  Third, the required 
disclosure must contain a false or misleading statement (an actionable 
misrepresentation) or must omit certain material information required to 
make included information not misleading (an omission).83  Fourth, the 
element of deception may be met when a director allows a false 
disclosure to be issued.84  Federal courts have held that scienter for 
federal securities law claims includes willfulness, intentionality, severe 
recklessness, and extreme departures from the standard of care.85 
Direct SEC claims under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are often 
accompanied by claims that the defendants violated Section 13(a) of the 
Exchange Act, along with Rules 13a-1 and 12b-20,86 Sections 13(b)(2)(A), 
13(b)(2)(B),87 and 13(b)(5), Rule 13b2-1, Rule 13b2-2, and Section 17(a) of 
the Securities Act.  These statute sections and regulations deal with 
annual report filings and fraud in connection with the offer or sale of a 
security.  These sections do not require that the SEC prove scienter.  
Furthermore, liability for failure to maintain adequate internal 
accounting controls and financial recordkeeping may arise under the 
 
81 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007). 
82 Id. 
83 See Carl W. Mills, Note, Breach of Fiduciary Duty as Securities Fraud: SEC v. Chancellor 
Corp., 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 439, 478 (2005). 
84 See Mills, supra note 83, at 480. 
85 See Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-99 (1976); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 
n.263; see also Mills, supra note 83, at 480-81. 
86 See supra note 12 (quoting Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5); 15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (2000); 17 
C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.12b-20 (2007); see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (citing 
in part and quoting in part Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Section 305(b), which incorporates wrongs 
under Section 10(b)); In re Michael Marchese, No. 34-47732, 2003 WL 1940244, at *5 (Apr. 
24, 2003) (citing several cases holding that scienter is not required to show a violation of 
Sections 13(a)-(b) of the Exchange Act or of Section 17(a) of the Securities Act). 
87 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2000); supra note 86 (discussing the application of 
Marchese). 
Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires every reporting 
company to make and keep books, records and accounts that 
accurately and fairly reflect the issuer’s transactions.  Section 
13(b)(2)(B) requires a company to devise and maintain a system of 
internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that 
transactions are recorded as necessary to permit the preparation of 
financial statements in conformity with GAAP. 
Marchese, 2003 WL 1940244, at *5. 
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securities laws.88  The issue of whether or not the defendant acted with 
the requisite scienter under Section 10(b) usually bears the closest 
scrutiny. 
In the archetypal scenario, one or more senior officers participate in 
the accounting fraud by recording false numbers in accounting records, 
“making up” accounting methods not in conformance with generally 
accepted (or other legitimate) accounting principles or creating false 
purchase orders and bank records.89  Also, one or more such officers 
issue false and misleading press releases regarding the corporation’s 
earnings or revenues.90  This behavior is deliberate fraud in violation of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—the defendants willfully made 
misrepresentations to the public regarding the corporation’s securities.  
Moreover, the officers in this scenario file the false information with the 
SEC in required quarterly and annual financial reports, violating not 
only Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but also statutes and regulations 
requiring the filing of accurate and truthful information in reports 
required by the SEC.91  To make matters worse, chief executive officers 
and chief financial officers of the offending entities (or those individuals 
filling those positions) violate SOA Section 301’s certification provision 
by signing the filings and certifying that the filings are accurate and 
truthful.92 
The issue under federal law is whether “a sustained or systematic 
failure of the board to exercise oversight[]” demonstrates the requisite 
 
88 In addition, there may be a claim that the defendants aided and abetted violations of 
the above provisions or caused violations of the above provisions. 
89 See, e.g., SEC v. Elsie M. Leung, No. 19558, 2006 WL 305789, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 
2006) (where Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc.’s chief financial officer “directed and 
approved” fraudulent revenue reporting and lied to auditors about how certain 
transactions were structured); SEC v. Umesh Malhotra et al., No. 18162, No. 1:03CV00211 
(May 30, 2003) (alleging that senior officers engaged in accounting tricks to defraud 
investors); SEC v. Eagle Bldg. Tech., Inc. and Anthony Damato, No. 17803, 2002 WL 
31386094 (D.D.C. Oct. 23, 2002) (case in which former president and chief executive officer 
of Eagle Building Technologies, Inc. falsified purchase orders and bank documents so as to 
inflate the company’s revenues). 
90 See, e.g., SEC v. Maxxon et al., No. 19132, 2005 WL 597023 (D.N.D. Mar. 14, 2005) 
(President of company made false and misleading statements about company’s main 
product); Damato, 2002 WL 31386094; supra note 81. 
91 See, e.g., Damato, 2002 WL 31386094 (where former president and chief executive 
officer Damato falsified accounting data reported to the public in annual and quarterly 
reports filed with the SEC); see supra notes 81-82; supra note 12 (quoting the texts of Section 
10(b) and Rule 10b-5).  See generally notes 78-79 and accompanying text (citing an array of 
statutes and regulations regarding truthful submissions to the SEC). 
92 See, e.g., SEC v. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Inc. et al., No. 19485, 2005 WL 3304009 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2005). 
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level of scienter.93  Federal courts have found that egregious disregard 
for internal controls and monitoring suffices to establish scienter.94  Thus, 
an extreme departure from reasonable monitoring and oversight may 
suffice for liability under federal law, even if such departure does not 
amount to a willful departure from due care.95 
Additional claims may arise from the above-described scheme to 
defraud.  For example, the fact that records can easily be falsified may 
indicate that management directors failed to put internal controls in 
place, failed to devise effective internal controls, or utterly disregarded 
internal controls that were in place.96  These monitoring lapses violate 
SOA Section 404 and play into the determination that management acted 
with intent to defraud.  A reasonable inference is that management failed 
to create or use internal controls in order to avoid leaving a paper trail 
and to make the fraud more difficult for outside auditors, the SEC, and 
other watchdogs to detect.97 
One scheme involves attempts to create new accounting 
methodologies that stretch the limits of accounting principles, followed 
by the senior executives’ refusals to correct errors created by the 
 
93 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996). see supra 
text accompanying note 60. 
94 Caremark, 698 A.2d at 971; see supra note 77 and accompanying text (explaining the 
scienter requirement under securities regulation suits in federal court). 
95 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  A trend may exist in state courts to hold 
directors liable for failure to respond to red flags generated by internal control systems, 
even when those red flags were not directly in front of the board.  See Burch, supra note 65, 
at 496-97.  However, directors like Marchese and Peselman were aware of red flags, but 
took no steps to respond to those red flags.  See generally In re Michael Marchese, No. 34-
47732, 2003 WL 1940244 (Apr. 24, 2003); SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 1:03-CV-10762, 2003 
WL 23885225 (D. Mass. Apr. 24, 2003).  Their behavior likely should suffice to establish 
liability in state court, unless those effects are mitigated by exculpatory provisions and 
directors’ and officers’ indemnification insurance. 
96 See, e.g., SEC v. Solucorp Indus. Ltd., 274 F. Supp. 2d. 379, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding 
that the president and the chief financial officer of the company “either circumvented or 
failed to implement” internal accounting controls for the corporation); SEC v. CIBC Mellon 
Trust Co., No. 19081, 2005 WL 372505, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2005) (noting the allegation 
that CIBC Mellon “fail[ed] to have sufficient policies, procedures[,] and internal controls in 
place” and thus did not detect bribery and illegal conduct by certain of its officers and 
directors); SEC v. Dale Peterson et al., No. 17439, 2002 WL 461337, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 
2002) (alleging that the CEO remarked he was “sick of people thinking Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles was important” and that orders to disregard GAAP came from the 
top). 
97 Similarly, market timing schemes, whereby trades are executed at an earlier or later 
time instead of on the day the order was received, may indicate internal controls that are 
too easily thwarted.  See, e.g., Cedric Kushner Promotions, 2005 WL 3304009. 
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seriously flawed methodology.98  The size of the error, the length of time 
the error stood uncorrected, management’s refusal to correct the error 
despite an outside auditor’s advice to do so, and attempts to hide the 
error from accountants are factors indicating management’s attempts to 
defraud the investing public.  For example, in one company, Waste 
Management, Inc., the error stood uncorrected for two years and 
exceeded $100 million.99  Moreover, Waste Management executives 
“concealed [the error] from the Company’s outside auditors.”100  Failure 
to correct the errors amounted to failure to monitor and respond to red 
flags and demonstrated that management acted with scienter.101 
In several cases against management directors, these directors 
manipulated accounts to inflate revenues, filed false reports with the 
SEC, and profited by engaging in classical insider trading.  However, 
failure to monitor might violate Section 10(b)’s antifraud provision, even 
in the absence of these activities.  Also, liability under Sections 10(b) and 
17(a)(2) may arise in the context of offering statements if directors 
affirmatively state in a prospectus that they have met their state law 
monitoring duties.  If the prospectus contains such affirmative 
representations, then those representations set the standard by which the 
SEC can measure the directors’ managerial performance.102  Moreover, 
liability may arise if the directors totally abdicated responsibility and the 
statements fail to disclose that the directors were deficient in meeting 
their state law monitoring duties.103  Additionally, even though liability 
under Section 10(b) arises only if the defendant was under a duty to 
speak, under both federal and state law, an affirmative false statement by 
management creates a duty to correct the misrepresentation. 
B. Unfitness to Serve Based on Failure to Monitor and Investigate 
A determination that a management director is unfit to serve is an 
interim step after the determination that the director has violated either 
 
98 See, e.g., SEC v. Deal L. Buntrock, et al., No. 18913, 2004 WL 2192396, at *1 (Sept. 30, 
2004) (where senior executives failed to correct errors created by Waste Management’s vice 
president of finance’s new—but fatally flawed—accounting methodology, despite being 
put on notice that the methodology overstated income). 
99 See id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id.  Even if the defendants initially were not dishonest, at some point during the two 
year period in which the directors let the error stand, the executives’ behavior was 
fraudulent—probably at or before the point they determined to conceal the error from 
Waste Management’s outside auditors. 
102 In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *9 (July 31, 1964). 
103 Id. 
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Section 10(b) or Section 17(a)(2), and prior to the determination that the 
director should be barred from serving as an officer or director of a 
public corporation.  Prior to SOA, the SEC could seek a bar order only in 
federal district court and only on a showing of “substantial unfitness[.]”  
A six-factor test used to determine “substantial unfitness[]” was 
developed in SEC v. Patel: 
(1) the ‘egregiousness’ of the underlying securities law 
violation; 
(2) the defendant’s ‘repeat offender’ status; 
(3) the defendant’s ‘role’ or position when he engaged in 
the fraud; 
(4) the defendant’s degree of scienter; 
(5) the defendant’s economic stake in the violation; and 
(6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur.104 
After Patel and SOA’s enactment, some courts have used a slightly 
modified version of the Patel test to determine unfitness, while others 
have adopted additional factors, including: 
the nature and complexity of the scheme; . . . the use of 
corporate resources [company time or resources] in 
executing the scheme; . . . the loss to investors and others 
as a result of the scheme; . . . the defendant’s use of 
stealth and concealment; [] the defendant’s history of 
business and related misconduct; and [] the defendant’s 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing and the credibility of 
his contrition.105 
It is clear that Congress intended to lower the standard for measuring 
unfitness.  Since the finding is based on a balancing test, unfitness may 
occur if one factor is particularly egregious or if several factors are 
implicated.  Moreover, courts generally take a holistic approach in 
evaluating whether the defendant’s conduct demonstrates unfitness, and 
SEC complaints and litigation releases generally specify misconduct 
along the same lines.106 
Under the current SEC and federal court approaches, “sustained and 
systematic” failures to monitor and investigate red flags may lead to a 
 
104 SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 141 (2d Cir. 1995). 
105 SEC v. Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d 121, 145 (D.D.C. 2007) (citing Barnard, supra note 78, at 
46). 
106 See id. (stating that the factors cited are neither exhaustive nor mandatory). 
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determination that the defendant is unfit to serve.  For example, the 
accounting fraud in Waste Management’s case was based on a complex 
accounting methodology where corporate personnel executed the fraud, 
losses exceeded $100 million, and the defendants concealed material 
information from outside auditors.  Also, the defendants’ conduct in that 
case demonstrated unfitness under the pre-SOA test.  The defendants’ 
behavior was egregious over the course of two years, and senior 
executives knowingly executed the fraud. 
To determine the likelihood of future misconduct, courts consider 
past misconduct, lack of contrition, and acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing.  For example, a senior officer who denied that he had 
engaged in fraud, despite strong evidence to the contrary, and who 
insisted that the SEC brought fraud charges because it was out to get 
him, was found unfit to serve.  As another example, first-time offenders, 
who became involved with public companies after a jury verdict of 
fraud, were found unfit to serve “notwithstanding their status as first-
time offenders[;]”107 their conduct demonstrated “a spectre of [future] 
misconduct.”108 
C. The Bar Remedy for Failure to Monitor and Investigate 
In determining whether the remedies should include a temporary or 
permanent bar, courts use factors such as the impact and severity of the 
fraud, the prior history of misconduct, and acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing to determine whether a temporary or permanent ban is an 
appropriate remedy.  While past violations are “not essential” for 
imposing a lifetime ban, “it is essential, in the absence of such violations, 
that a district court articulate the factual basis for a finding of the 
likelihood of recurrence.”109  Moreover, courts consider whether a 
conditional or limited bar is sufficient, especially where there is no prior 
history of unfitness, but other factors may outweigh the lack of prior 
history of business misconduct.110  For example, a defendant’s continued 
refusal to admit wrongdoing in the face of evidence otherwise, combined 
with violation of a preliminary injunction, weighs in favor of a decades-
long or a permanent ban.111  Further, a base of operations in another 
country, with a record of violations in the other country, but no violation 
 
107 Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 146-47 (imposing a ten-year ban in light of defendants’ lack 
of prior unfitness). 
108 Id. at 146. 
109 Patel, 61 F.3d at 142; see Levine, 517 F. Supp. 2d at 146-47. 
110 Patel, 61 F.3d at 142. 
111 SEC v. Robinson, No. 00 Civ. 7452, 2002 WL 1552049, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2002). 
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of a preliminary injunction in the U.S., weighs against a permanent ban 
and in favor of a twenty-year ban.112  Accounting fraud, combined with 
public misrepresentations and failure to implement internal controls, 
weigh in favor of a permanent ban. 
IV.  BARS AGAINST NON-MANAGEMENT DIRECTORS FOR FAILURE TO 
MONITOR AND INVESTIGATE 
Despite the unique role of non-management directors as corporate 
securities monitors, liability rarely exists if they fail to fulfill that 
function.113  And yet, non-management directors do fail, as evidenced by 
reports about the role of the board and non-management directors in 
Enron, WorldCom, and Waste Management.  Non-management 
directors have some responsibility for internal controls; if no controls are 
in place or there is a systematic failure, even non-management directors 
should be aware of the failure and take steps to correct the problem.  
Further, non-management directors may be just as liable under Sections 
10(b) and 17(a)(2) as management directors.  If non-management 
directors turn a blind eye to red flags, their culpability should be 
analyzed under the same scheme as if a management director engaged in 
that conduct. 
To bar non-management directors, the three levels of analysis 
described in Part III.A would apply, but the offending conduct likely will 
be different from the management director conduct that violates the rule.  
This Part discusses the offending conduct, the unfitness factors, and the 
bar order. 
A. Non-Management Directors’ Failure to Monitor May Amount to Securities 
Fraud 
While complaints against management directors generally stem from 
actual falsification of accounting records, false press releases, or 
misrepresentations in SEC filings, complaints against non-management 
directors more often arise from non-management directors’ awareness of 
and failure to prevent management directors’ accounting fraud.  This 
 
112 SEC v. Save the World Air, Inc., 2005 WL 3077514, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2005) 
(holding that although defendant continued to protest innocence, despite evidence that he 
must have known of misrepresentations, defendant should be subject to a limited 20-year 
ban, and not a lifetime ban, even though a lifetime ban would not be an abuse of 
discretion).  Perhaps the court was thinking he should be just Australia’s problem.  Prior to 
this case, he was cited in Australia for selling unregistered securities. 
113 See generally Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director 
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (2006). 
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behavior may violate Sections 10(b), 13, and 404.  Four recent cases 
illustrate securities laws claims based on non-management failure to 
monitor. 
1. The Chancellor case 
Compared to the massive frauds and accounting restatements at 
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, and Tyco, among others, in which 
equity, revenues, and assets were restated by hundreds of millions, if not 
billions of dollars, pension plans evaporated overnight, and thousands of 
employees became jobless, the alleged fraud at Chancellor was minor.114  
But viewed in light of SEC enforcement trends, the case may have 
significant impact on corporate director behavior.  The case brought by 
the SEC against Chancellor is notable because the SEC sought to hold 
Rudolph Peselman, a non-management director and audit committee 
member, liable for securities fraud for “recklessly sign[ing] a number of 
financial statements that were materially misleading” and for taking “no 
care to ensure their accuracy.”115  Also, the SEC sought permanently to 
ban Peselman from serving as an officer or director of any publicly 
traded company.  The allegations against Michael Marchese, a non-
management director and member of the audit committee, were 
essentially the same, but the SEC brought an administrative proceeding 
against him, seeking a cease and desist order.  This difference in the type 
of proceeding may be due to the fact that Marchese filed a letter with the 
SEC expressing concerns with Chancellor’s financial reporting. 
In April of 2003, the SEC filed its civil complaint against Chancellor 
and its senior officers (a non-management director, Peselman; Metcalf 
Davis, Chancellor’s independent auditor; and Gregory Davis, 
Chancellor’s audit engagement partner).  In a related matter, the SEC 
filed an administrative proceeding against Michael Marchese.116  The 
SEC alleged that Chancellor’s Chief Executive Officer, Brian Adley, 
orchestrated an accounting fraud to overstate Chancellor’s revenue by 
improperly consolidating revenue from MRB, Inc. (“MRB”), a newly 
 
114 Compare supra notes 6-7, 9-10 and accompanying text, with supra note 26 and 
accompanying text.  For example, the literature dealing solely with Enron as a case study in 
business and legal ethics is voluminous compared to the handful of articles that discuss the 
Chancellor case. 
115 SEC v. Chancellor Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10762, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 5 (D. Mass. 2003). 
116 In re Michael Marchese, No. 34-47732, 2003 WL 1940244 (Apr. 24, 2003); see supra notes 
78-79. 
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acquired subsidiary, prior to the acquisition’s closing.117  Further, the 
complaint alleged that Adley improperly caused Chancellor to report 
fees paid to Vestex, an entity that Adley controlled, for services 
purportedly rendered by Vestex to Chancellor in connection with the 
acquisition of the subsidiary.118  The SEC alleged that few, if any, services 
were rendered in exchange for the reported fees.119  Moreover, the SEC 
alleged that Adley directed the fees to be capitalized as an asset of 
Chancellor, instead of properly reporting the fees as an expense.120  As a 
result of this scheme, Chancellor overstated its 1998 revenue by 177%, its 
net income by $850,000, and its assets by $3.3 million.121 
In early 1999, Chancellor’s outside auditors, Reznick Fedder, 
informed the management directors that it was improper to consolidate 
MRB’s revenues unless Chancellor had control over MRB’s operations 
prior to the closing.  Senior management reacted by delivering to 
Reznick Fedder documents demonstrating effective control of MRB.122 
However, Reznick Fedder was not convinced that Chancellor’s so-
called control over MRB’s affairs justified consolidating MRB’s and 
Chancellor’s financial statements.123  Reznick Fedder provided to senior 
management accounting literature that outlined the standards to be met 
for proper consolidation.124  Senior management then provided to 
Reznick Fedder amended documents that purported to show that 
Chancellor exercised the requisite control over MRB’s day-to-day 
operations and financial decision-making according to the criteria 
discussed in the accounting literature provided by Reznick Fedder.125  
When Reznick Fedder refused to change its position and issue an 
unqualified audit opinion,126 Chancellor’s senior management fired 
 
117 Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 2.  Chancellor began the process of acquiring MRB, 
Inc. (“MRB”), a closely held Georgia corporation, on August 10, 1998.  Id. at ¶ 22.  Under 
GAAP, the financial results of the two companies could be consolidated either as of the 
closing date, or as of the time that Chancellor gained effective control over MRB.  Id. at 
¶ 68.  The closing occurred on January 29, 1999.  Id. at ¶ 22.  Chancellor consolidated MRB’s 
revenue in Chancellor’s 1998 financial results.  Id. at ¶ 23.  The Division alleged that 
Chancellor gained effective control over MRB as of the 1999 closing date, and not prior to 
the closing date.  Id. at ¶ 24. 
118 Id. at ¶ 33. 
119 Id. at ¶ 8. 
120 Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at ¶ 24. 
123 Id. at ¶ 23. 
124 Id. at ¶ 25. 
125 Id. at ¶ 26. 
126 Id. at ¶ 28. 
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Reznick Fedder, in part due to the dispute over consolidation of MRB’s 
financial results.127 
Chancellor then hired Metcalf Davis.  Metcalf Davis issued an 
unqualified audit opinion despite awareness of various red flags, 
including the dispute over consolidating MRB’s results, concerns on the 
part of a senior manager on the audit team over the authenticity of the 
amendment, the lack of documentation of services provided by Vestex, 
and knowledge that consolidation of MRB’s financial results and 
capitalization of the Vestex fees would result in reporting a significantly 
improved financial picture for Chancellor than would otherwise be the 
case.128 
After receiving notification from Reznick Fedder that it had advised 
Chancellor that its accounting treatment of the MRB acquisition did not 
comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), the 
SEC began a review of Chancellor’s 1998 annual report on Form 10-KSB 
and other financial filings.129  The SEC’s complaint followed shortly after 
its review of Chancellor’s filings. 
The SEC alleged “Peselman was aware of the disagreement over the 
consolidation date and approved the dismissal of Reznick Fedder, but 
took no steps to determine whether Chancellor’s position on that issue 
was incorrect.”130  According to the SEC, Peselman should have asked 
why Metcalf Davis approved the 1998 consolidation, “even though that 
approval was completely contrary to Reznick Fedder’s position on the 
issue.”131  Further, the SEC complaint alleged that Peselman, among 
others, knew of red flags related to the MRB acquisition and fees paid for 
services performed by Vestex, yet signed Chancellor’s annual report for 
fiscal year 1998 “without taking any steps to ensure that it did not 
contain materially misleading statements.”132 
The complaint charged Peselman with “engag[ing] in fraudulent 
activities resulting in material overstatements of revenue, income, and 
 
127 Id.  Chancellor Corporation informed the SEC that Reznick Fedder had approved the 
filings.  Id. at ¶¶ 40-42. 
128 Id. at ¶ 72. 
129 Id. at ¶ 43. 
130 Id. at ¶ 29.  The complaint alleges that Reznick Fedder reaffirmed its position in a 
memorandum sent to the audit committee, consisting of Adley and Marchese, and at a 
subsequent board meeting attended by Adley, Churchill (Chancellor’s President), and 
Peselman.  Id. at ¶ 25. 
131 Id. at ¶ 48. 
132 Id. 
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assets in Chancellor’s public announcements and in its filings with the 
Commission[] . . . in violation of Section 10(b) of the Exchange 
Act . . . and Rule 10b-5 . . . .”133  Further, the complaint charged Peselman 
with aiding and abetting Chancellor’s reporting of false and misleading 
statements in the annual report in violation of Section 13(a) of the 
Exchange Act and Rules 12b-20 and 13a-1.134  Moreover, the complaint 
charged that Peselman “knew, or was reckless in not knowing,” that 
Chancellor maintained false and misleading books and records, and that 
Peselman “knowingly and substantially assisted Chancellor to keep and 
maintain false and misleading books and records” for its 1998 and 1999 
fiscal years and associated fiscal quarters,135 in violation of Section 
13(b)(2)(A)136 of the Exchange Act.  Finally, the complaint charged that 
Peselman aided and abetted Chancellor’s failure to devise and maintain 
a system of internal controls necessary to permit the preparation of 
Chancellor’s financial statements in accordance with GAAP.137 
The SEC sought civil monetary penalties pursuant to Section 20(e) of 
the Exchange Act and a permanent injunction prohibiting Peselman from 
violating Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), and 13(b)(2)(B) of the 
Exchange Act.138  Also, the SEC sought an order permanently barring 
 
133 Id. at ¶ 84-85.  Also, it charged that Peselman’s conduct “involved fraud, deceit, or 
deliberate or reckless disregard [for] regulatory requirements, and resulted in substantial 
loss, or significant risk of substantial loss, to other persons, within the meaning of Section 
21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act.”  Id. at ¶ 86.  Section 21(d)(3) of the Exchange Act allows the 
Commission to seek civil penalties up to $100,000 if “(aa) the violation . . . involved fraud, 
deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement; and 
(bb) such violation directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created a 
significant risk of substantial losses to other persons.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii)(aa)-
(bb).  A question remains as to whether such reckless disregard of regulatory requirements 
constitutes a crime. 
134 Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 7.  Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78m(a), requires that companies trading on national securities exchanges file annual 
reports.  Rule 12b-20, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (2007), requires that filings with the SEC be 
updated with additional information so that those filings are not misleading.  Rule 13a-1 
requires the filing of annual reports for publicly-traded companies.  17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-1 
(2007). 
135 Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 108. 
136 Id. at ¶ 109.  Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act requires that publicly-traded 
companies maintain records that “accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and 
dispositions of the assets of the issuer[.]”  15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (2000 & Supp. 2005). 
137 Chancellor, 2003 WL 23885225, at ¶ 114.  Again, Peselman “knew, or was reckless in 
not knowing, that Chancellor’s conduct was improper[]” and “knowingly and substantially 
assisted Chancellor’s failure to devise and maintain” such internal controls, in violation of 
Section 13(b)(2)(B) of the Exchange Act.  Id. at ¶ 115. 
138 Id. at Prayer for Relief ¶ IV, ¶ 116. 
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Peselman (among others) from serving as an officer or director of any 
publicly-traded company.139 
Marchese and the SEC consented to the entry of a settlement order at 
the institution of the cease and desist proceedings.140  The order stated 
that Marchese “failed to perform his duties as a director.  He recklessly 
ignored signs pointing to improper accounting treatment, thereby 
allowing management’s fraud to continue.  He acted recklessly in 
signing Chancellor’s Form 10-KSB for 1998, which contained materially 
misleading statements.”141  Furthermore, “Marchese approved the firing 
[of Reznick Fedder] although he knew that it was at least partly due to 
the auditors’ disagreement with Adley.”142  Moreover, in a statement that 
accords even more closely with the language of due care articulated in 
state court opinions, the SEC alleged that “Marchese’s dereliction of his 
duty as an outside director is more broadly reflected in his complete 
failure ever to review Chancellor’s accounting procedures or internal 
controls, or even to become aware that he was an audit committee 
member[] . . . .”143  However, as mentioned previously, possibly because 
Marchese cooperated with the SEC, the SEC did not seek an order 
barring Marchese from serving as an officer or director. 
2. Other post-SOA cases 
In another 2003 proceeding, the SEC charged Tucker, a non-
management director and member of the audit committee at Candies, 
Inc., with aiding and abetting violations of Sections 10(b) and 13(a).  The 
SEC complaint alleged that Tucker knew that Candie’s senior 
management engaged in accounting fraud.144  Further, Tucker helped 
Candie’s senior management obtain false documentation in support of 
accounting fraud.  Moreover, Tucker, as a member of the audit 
committee, either knew or was reckless in not knowing, that the outside 
auditors questioned a number of transactions and refused to sign off on 
 
139 Id. at ¶ VI. 
140 In re Michael Marchese, No. 34-47732, 2003 WL 1940244, at *1, *6 (Apr. 24, 2003); see 
supra notes 78-79.  An overwhelming number of administrative proceedings are resolved 
through a consent decree, in which the defendant neither admits nor denies the SEC’s 
findings of fact or conclusions of law.  As is typical in these proceedings, Marchese neither 
admitted nor denied the SEC’s factual findings, except as to the SEC’s jurisdiction over him 
and the subject matter of the proceedings.  Id. at *1 ¶ II. 
141 Id. at *1-2. 
142 Id.; see supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
143 Marchese, 2003 WL 1940244 at *1-2. 
144  SEC v. Lawrence O’Shaughnessy, Civ. Action, 03-3021, ¶¶ 97-98 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18120a.htm. 
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the financial statements.  Tucker agreed to a five-year ban as part of his 
settlement with the SEC. 
In a 2004 proceeding, the SEC charged Del Global, its senior officers, 
and the Chair of Del Global’s Audit Committee with a three-year 
financial fraud involving improper accounting for an acquisition by Del 
Global, among other matters.145  The complaint alleged that the audit 
committee chair, at the request of the chief financial officer and in order 
to satisfy concerns raised by outside auditors who questioned the 
transaction, falsely confirmed that his audit firm had performed 
accounting work related to the acquisition.  The audit committee chair’s 
conduct violated books and records provisions, internal controls 
provisions, and lying-to-auditors provisions. 
In another 2004 proceeding, the SEC instituted cease and desist 
proceedings against Ture Roland Fahlin, a non-management director 
and member of the supervisory board of a Swiss company trading on the 
New York Stock Exchange, for improper accounting for a joint 
venture.146  Fahlin signed a letter stating that Ahold had control over the 
joint venture for purposes of consolidating its financial results with those 
of the joint venture and then rescinded the letter but failed to inform the 
outside auditors that the letter was rescinded.  The SEC charged that, 
“[a]s a result of Fahlin’s failure to fulfill his duties described above as a 
member of Ahold’s supervisory board and audit committee, Fahlin was 
a cause of Ahold’s violation of Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) of the 
Exchange Act.”147  However, the SEC did not seek penalties other than a 
cease and desist order, at the request of the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s 
Office, which was conducting a parallel criminal investigation and 
sought to avoid potential double-jeopardy issues. 
3. Pre-SOA cases 
Prior to the early 1970’s and the failure of Penn Central Company, 
the SEC’s involvement in issues of director oversight was fairly 
passive.148  While the SEC did fault non-management directors for failure 
to monitor, until recently and after SOA, it had not sought bar orders 
against non-management directors.  However, over the intervening 
 
145 SEC v. Del Global Tech. Corp., Civ. Action, 04-4092 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp18732.pdf. 
146 In re Ture Roland Fahlin, http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-50519.htm (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
147 Id. at § 3. 
148 H. LOWELL BROWN, BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE § 8.7 (2003). 
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years, the SEC has addressed the obligations of non-management 
directors where the company’s violations involved possible securities 
fraud and where a company’s violations do not constitute fraud.149 
In 1975, certain senior officers and employees of Stirling Homex 
engaged in a fraudulent scheme “to show continually increasing sales 
and earnings[]” by recording “fictitious sales, earnings, and assets.”150  
Stirling Homex filed with the SEC and distributed to its shareholders 
“materially false and misleading registration statements, press releases, 
annual and periodic reports[,] and other materials . . . .”151  The directors, 
who were financially sophisticated, questioned the senior officers about 
certain financial information that indicated an ongoing liquidity problem 
at the corporation.152  The directors accepted superficial answers and 
failed to follow-up on requests for financial information that (as it turned 
out) was never provided.153  The SEC faulted the directors because: 
Neither . . . [of the directors] were informed nor realized 
that the company was suffering serious operating and 
financial difficulties[,] and they made no greater effort to 
involve themselves in the company’s affairs in 1971 or 
early 1972.  Instead, on this and other occasions, they 
relied on the self-serving representations of Stirling 
Homex management and actions by the company’s 
accountants, bankers, and investment counsel which 
they perceived to be favorable.154 
The SEC labeled the directors’ job performance “not adequate[]” because 
their presence on the board did not “have the impact upon the 
company’s operations which shareholders and others might reasonably 
have expected.”155 
More recently, in 1994, the SEC charged Cooper Corporation, its 
former chief executive officer, and former chief operating officer with 
 
149 E.g., In re W. R. Grace & Co., No. 39157, 1997 WL 597984, at *1, n.4 (Sept. 30, 1997) 
(reporting investigation into the conduct of certain officers and directors, particularly non-
management directors). 
150 In re Stirling Homex Corp., No. 11516, 1975 WL 163038, at *1 (July 2, 1975) (report of 
investigation relating to activities of the board of directors). 
151 Id. 
152 See generally id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *4. 
155 Id. at *5, *6. 
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fraudulent schemes involving frontrunning156 and market manipulation 
of bonds, seeking an injunction against the corporation and its former 
chiefs.157  The board of directors took no action to remove the senior 
officers from their management positions from which they could 
effectuate the fraudulent schemes, even after the board was informed 
that the officers were indicted and were not cooperating with 
independent legal counsel hired by the board.158  Furthermore, the board 
took no steps to reclaim from the officers certain profits that the officers 
had obtained due to conflict of interest transactions that were unknown 
to the board at the time of the transaction, but that should have been 
disclosed to the board under the corporation’s policies.159  Moreover, the 
board allowed the senior officers to continue to operate the corporation 
and to issue a misleading press release that the company was reviewing 
the SEC’s allegations and was unaware of any wrongdoing by the senior 
officers.  This was despite the fact that the board was aware that the 
officers were under investigation and that the officers refused to 
cooperate with the board’s own legal counsel.  As a result of the 
misleading press release, the corporation was charged with violating 
Sections 10(b) and 13(a) of the Exchange Act. 
The SEC faulted the board for not moving “aggressively to fulfill 
their responsibilities to oversee the conduct and performance of 
management and to ensure that the company’s public statements [were] 
candid and complete.”160  According to the SEC, “potential violations of 
the federal securities laws involving self-dealing and fraud by 
management [were] called to the attention of the board of directors” and 
the board “failed to take immediate and decisive corrective action on 
these matters and . . . appeared to prefer management’s interest in 
keeping the facts secret over the investors’ interest in full, fair and 
accurate disclosure under the federal securities laws.”161 
In Franchard, the SEC Division of Corporate Finance (the “Division”) 
brought stop order proceedings to suspend the effectiveness of 
 
156 An illegal front-run occurs when traders are alerted to large impending buy or sell 
orders and then profit by using this inside information to enter the market ahead of the 
large order. 
157 These activities also resulted in the senior officers’ criminal indictments and 
convictions under the mail and wire fraud statutes, RICO, the Investment Advisors Act, 
andothers. 
158 In re Stirling Homex Corp., No. 11516, 1975 WL 163038, at *1 (July 2, 1975). 
159 Id. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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registration statements pertaining to Franchard Corporation (formerly 
Glickman Corporation).162  The Division argued that the registration 
statement inadequately disclosed pledges of control stock and the 
transfer of corporate assets by Louis Glickman, the controlling 
shareholder, to a business separately owned by him, called Venada.163  
Further, the registration statement insufficiently disclosed whether the 
board had adequately performed its oversight functions.164  The directors 
were informed of the secret asset withdrawals and hired outside counsel 
to investigate Glickman’s liability for the withdrawals.165  Although 
Glickman promised to pay back the money with interest and to cease 
making withdrawals, he repaid the loans with interest but continued to 
make improper withdrawals from Glickman Corporation.166 
The SEC agreed with the Division that the prospectuses were 
deficient because they failed to disclose Glickman’s transfers of funds to 
Venada and his pledges of his control stock in Glickman Corporation.167  
Outside counsel found that Glickman Corporation’s inadequate 
administrative procedures had to some extent facilitated the CEO’s 
secret activities.168  Nonetheless, the SEC expressed reluctance to hold the 
directors liable for failure to do reasonable due diligence to ensure that 
the financial statements were correct, for failure to establish effective 
procedures for monitoring and overseeing the corporation, and for 
failure to disclose the above secretive acts.169 
 
162 In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *9 (July 31, 1964). 
163 Id. at *1. 
164 Id. at *8. 
165 Id. at *3. 
166 Id. 
167 Id.  The SEC addressed why disclosure of Glickman’s transactions was required in the 
registration statement.  Although some of the facts went to Glickman’s personal real estate 
ventures, the SEC asserted that these facts were material facts and should have been 
disclosed for the following reasons.  Id. at *6.  First, the withdrawals were significant 
withdrawals of cash when measured against Glickman Corporation stockholders’ equity 
and cash flow.  Id. at *7.  Second, the withdrawals implicated Glickman’s “managerial 
ability and personal integrity.”  Id. at *6.  Third, the offering of stock in Glickman 
Corporation was made primarily based on “[Louis] Glickman’s name and reputation as a 
successful real estate investor and operator[;]” thus, investors were being offered an 
opportunity to buy Glickman’s unique managerial expertise.  Id.  The secret transfer of 
funds just after the filing of the registration statement, from Glickman Corporation to 
Venada and Louis Glickman’s pledges of his interest in Glickman Corporation stock 
indicated, Glickman’s “strained financial position and his urgent need for cash in his 
personal real estate ventures[,]” facts that would be material to an evaluation of Glickman’s 
ability to manage Glickman Corporation.  Id. 
168 In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *8 (July 31, 1964). 
169 Id. 
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The Division argued that the directors made an implied statement 
that they properly managed the affairs of the corporation because the 
directors’ names were listed in the prospectus.170  Also, the Division 
argued that the directors did not meet the implied standard of behavior 
because the board did not exercise judgment independent from 
Glickman’s influence.171  However, the SEC disagreed with the Division 
because the prospectuses “contained no affirmative representations 
concerning the participation of the directors in [Glickman Corporation’s] 
affairs.”172  The Glickman Corporation prospectuses did not speak to the 
level of the directors’ management responsibility, merely because the 
directors’ names were listed as directors.  Likewise, the board met 
regularly and was informed by Glickman about the registration 
statements.173  The directors had not made an affirmative statement 
regarding their duties, nor had they totally abdicated their 
responsibilities, according to outside counsel.174 
In other early cases involving non-disclosure of material 
information, but not accounting fraud, the SEC described a non-
management director’s obligation to ensure that information 
disseminated by corporate managers paints an accurate picture of the 
financial health of the company.175  For example, Gould, Inc., failed to 
disclose, in its filings with the SEC, certain conflict-of-interest 
transactions between Gould and some of the members of Gould’s 
management.  The board of directors later learned of the interested 
transactions and approved them.  In its report of the investigation, the 
SEC faulted the board for approving the transactions without further 
 
170 Id. 
171 Id.  The Division argued that the board was in fact a “nullity”—the directors “agreed 
to Glickman’s proposals, derived their information as to the current state of [Glickman 
Corporation’s] finances from Glickman’s sporadic oral reports, and permitted him to fix 
each officer’s area of responsibility.”  Id. 
172 If the SEC were referring to broad statements that directors’ had met their duty, then 
after Franchard, corporations would be on notice to avoid broad statements regarding 
managerial performance in filings with the SEC.  Rather, a better view is that the SEC was 
referring to narrow statements regarding specific transactions in which board approval is 
required, such as fundamental corporate changes involving board interested transactions.  
In these situations, the SEC filing often refers to the procedure by which the board made its 
decision related to the transaction. 
173 Further, investors were aware that Glickman controlled the corporation and thus were 
on notice that he might hold sway over the board of directors. 
174 Id. 
175 E.g., In re National Telephone Co., Inc., No. 34-14380, 1978 WL 171339 (Jan. 16, 1978); 
In re Gould Inc., No. 34-13612, 1977 WL 175761 (June 9, 1977). 
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inquiry from anyone other than those with a material interest in the 
approval.176 
In another instance, the SEC investigated a misleading filing by 
National Telephone Co.177  The SEC alleged that the board of directors 
was aware that the corporation was in serious financial trouble, that 
management resisted making “full and fair disclosure[,]” and that 
“events central to the survival of the company” were involved.178  Under 
these circumstances, the SEC cautioned that, while non-management 
directors need not ensure every line of a press release is accurate, non-
management directors do have an obligation to ensure that press releases 
and reports to shareholders truthfully and fairly represent the financial 
health of a corporation. 
More recently, in 1997, the SEC investigated W.R. Grace & Co. along 
with certain officers and directors for violation of the proxy disclosure 
rules.179  Two non-management directors were aware of the information 
that was required to be disclosed; both reviewed the relevant 
documents.180  The SEC concluded “that [the directors] did not fulfill 
their obligations under the federal securities laws[]” because “each 
assumed, without taking the steps necessary to confirm their 
assumptions, that [W.R. Grace’s] procedures would produce drafts of 
disclosure documents describing all matters that required disclosure.”181  
Further, “[e]ach also assumed, without taking steps necessary to confirm 
their assumptions, that other corporate officers, including counsel, had 
conducted full and informed reviews of the drafts.”182  According to the 
SEC, “each had a responsibility to go beyond the established procedures 
to inquire into the reasons for non-disclosure of information of which 
they were aware.”183 
The above cases illustrate that the SEC has advised corporate 
directors of their responsibilities and roles in the context of overseeing 
the operation of corporations and the production of accurate 
communications to the SEC and the investing public about the financial 
health of corporations.  However, the SEC has been unwilling to use the 
 
176 See generally Gould, 1977 WL 175761. 
177 In Re National Telephone Company, 1978 WL 171339. 
178 Id. at *4. 
179 See generally In re W. R. Grace & Co., No. 39157, 1997 WL 597984 (Sept. 30, 1997). 
180 Id. at *2. 
181 Id. 
182 Id. 
183 Id. 
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full array of tools at its disposal to sanction non-management directors.  
Indeed, the Chancellor, Candie’s, Del Global, and Fahlin cases demonstrate 
the limits of the SEC’s recent use of its formidable array of sanctions to 
counter the most egregious lapses in directorial oversight. 
B. When are Non-Management Directors Unfit to Serve? 
The factors used to determine whether a non-management director is 
unfit should be the same as those used to determine whether a 
management director is unfit.  For example, Peselman, Tucker, 
Marchese, and Fahlin, as members of their corporations’ audit 
committees, played key roles in facilitating fraud at their companies.  If 
they did not have actual knowledge of fraud, they should have known of 
the fraud, because they reviewed financial statements and supervised 
the outside auditors who made the committee aware of red flags.  The 
frauds were continuing, and senior management acted deliberately to 
overstate earnings.  Also, accounting fraud is often complex and 
sophisticated.  The frauds in these cases were complex, in some cases 
involving accounting for revenues from acquired subsidiaries and joint 
ventures and in other cases involving accounting for revenue from 
numerous sales accounts.  Moreover, the defendants concealed the 
frauds from outside auditors.  Given these facts, the non-management 
directors met the test for unfitness.184  Notably, even the non-
management directors’ lack of knowledge of the internal affairs of the 
corporation does not excuse these directors’ failures to monitor, in part 
because the failure to monitor is egregious.  The frauds were long-
standing, and violations were clearly in front of the directors. 
C. Bar Orders Are an Appropriate Remedy 
Not surprisingly, courts weigh similar conduct and factors once it is 
determined that the defendant is unfit.  The test again is a balancing test.  
Also, the issue may be whether there is a likelihood of future 
misconduct.  As with cases involving management directors, likelihood 
should be measured by evidence of a history of past misconduct, 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing, and evidence of contrition.  Non-
management directors who inform the SEC of wrongdoing or who 
cooperate with the SEC may face a temporary bar or a cease and desist 
 
184 See Michael Dailey, Officer and Director Bars: Who is Substantially Unfit to Serve After 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 837, 852-59 (2003) (arguing for a factor analysis to 
determine whether a bar order is appropriate); see also Philip F.S. Berg, Unfit to Serve: 
Permanently Barring People From Serving as Officers and Directors of Publicly-Traded Companies 
After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1871, 1902-04 (2003). 
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order.  Directors who allow fraud to continue, or who aid and abet fraud, 
should face a longer bar.  Further, past violations or the violation of a 
preliminary injunction may also weigh in favor of a bar. 
V.  CHALLENGES AND POLICY ISSUES 
Chancellor was touted as the first salvo in a war against accounting 
fraud.185  However, for the war to be won, the SEC must succeed in the 
face of several possible challenges.  One set of challenges likely will stem 
from the argument that Congress did not delegate to the SEC the power 
to bring what some describe as state law fiduciary duty claims in 
administrative proceedings or in federal court.  As the SEC itself has 
acknowledged, SEC review of directors’ behavior implicates separation 
of powers issues.186  Therefore, a question becomes whether Congress 
intended the SEC regulation of fraud to reach board oversight behavior.  
Neither the legislative history of the Securities Act of 1933187 nor that of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934188 gives an express indication that 
Congress intended to provide the SEC with the power to set standards of 
behavior or corporate directors in the performance of their oversight of 
corporate operations. 
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court established in Santa Fe v. Green 
that a federal cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty does not 
exist.189  In Santa Fe, the plaintiffs, holders of the seller’s stock, argued 
that the merger price negotiated by the directors of the seller was unfair, 
and the directors had breached their fiduciary duty by negotiating an 
unfair price.  The plaintiffs claimed that the inadequate price was an 
attempt to defraud them of their shares and was actionable under 
Section 10(b).  Santa Fe can easily be distinguished from Chancellor, Del 
Global, Candie’s, Fahlin, and the other failure to monitor cases that sound 
in accounting fraud, misrepresentations, and Section 10(b) violations.  
Despite the sound nature of these arguments distinguishing Santa Fe v. 
Green, no precedent other than Santa Fe exists to guide a court. 
The cause of action under federal law against the directors who fail 
to monitor and oversee can be characterized as follows:  the directors 
 
185 CHI. SUN TIMES, August 21, 2003, available at 
http://www.suntimes.com/output/business/cst-fin-sec21.html.  See generally SEC v. 
Chancellor Corp., No. 03 Civ. 10762, 2003 WL 23885225, at Prayer for Relief (D. Mass. 2003). 
186 In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *8 (July 31, 1964). 
187 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
189 See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
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knowingly or at least recklessly failed to exercise management and 
oversight.  If they had exercised the appropriate oversight, then they 
would have known or should have known of the accounting fraud.  If 
they knew or should have known of the accounting fraud, then they had 
a federal law duty under the Exchange Act to ensure that the correct 
information was disclosed in filings with the SEC.  Because they did not 
ensure that the correct information was disclosed in SEC filings and 
press releases, they breached their obligations under the Exchange Act 
and the regulations promulgated thereunder. 
This Part will first examine whether the SEC has the power under 
the Exchange Act to bring what some (mis)characterize essentially as a 
breach of due care cause of action against non-management directors.  
Although some argue that “[t]he Chancellor action and the public 
comments of Messrs. Donaldson and Cutler together reflect the SEC’s 
intent to target [non-management] directors for negligent activity (or 
inactivity) and breaches of fiduciary duty,” this author argues that the 
SEC brings action against only those who intentionally or recklessly 
ignore clear warning signs, in other words, directors who knew or 
should have known of fraud and took no steps to stop it.190  Second, this 
Part discusses the standard of proof for the underlying violation, the 
unfitness issue and whether a bar order is the appropriate remedy.  
Third, this Part considers the nature of the incentives that such SEC 
action would create.  Fourth, the Part discusses whether the SEC is fit to 
serve in this role. 
A. Constitutional Challenges 
Although Congress established the SEC to regulate disclosure of 
corporate information and to enforce antifraud provisions, states still 
retain primary responsibility for regulation of corporate governance.191  
Therefore, the issue of whether the SEC has power to regulate the 
internal affairs of corporations is first governed by whether Congress has 
the power to delegate such power to the SEC under the Commerce 
 
190 John F.X. Peloso & Ben A. Indek, Outside Directors and Red Flags, 231 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2004).  
At the time of the Chancellor case, Donaldson was the SEC’s Chairman and Cutler its 
Enforcement Director.  Id. 
191 See Mills, supra note 83, at 446.  The author noted: “Congress was careful to also point 
out[] . . . that the legislation was not intended to supplant state regulation of internal 
corporate governance.”  Id. 
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Clause and second by whether Congress has delegated such power to 
the SEC under the Exchange Act (the enabling statute).192 
The courts have played a significant role in interpreting the 
Exchange Act, primarily through Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.193  The 
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized that Congress has power under 
the Commerce Clause to regulate the purchase and sale of securities, so 
long as such purchase and sale affects interstate commerce.  A more 
subtle issue may be whether “the connection between a required 
disclosure and an alleged fraud” stemming from mismanagement is too 
attenuated to give rise to a claim under the Exchange Act’s antifraud 
provisions.194 
Although Congress’s role in the development of antifraud causes of 
action was relatively limited prior to SOA, both the SEC and the courts 
have been active in shaping jurisprudence in this area.195  The Supreme 
Court, at times, has granted deference to the SEC on issues of 
implementation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, although the future of 
Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence is not certain.196  On the other hand, the Court 
has, at times, rejected the SEC’s view of the requirements of Rule 10b-5 in 
connection with insider trading lawsuits, although more recently the 
Court has accepted the SEC’s views in this area.197 
Moreover, and more importantly, the Court may look to how the 
SEC has interpreted Rule 10b-5 in similar cases and whether Congress 
has attempted to rein in the SEC.198  The SEC has concerned itself with 
corporate governance and standards of director behavior as those 
concepts are related to development of an efficient disclosure regime and 
of well-functioning capital markets.199  Indeed, the SEC expressed 
concern about the “development of disclosure standards adequate for 
 
192 Joan M. Heminway, Rock, Paper, Scissors:  Choosing the Right Vehicle for Federal Corporate 
Governance Initiatives, FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 225, 254-55 (2005). 
193 Stephen J. Choi and A.C. Pritchard, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 20 
(Foundation Press 2005). 
194 See Mills, supra note 83, at 497-98. 
195 Choi and Pritchard, supra note 193 at 464. 
196 Contrast traditional misappropriation theories versus misappropriation theories of 
insider trading under 10b-5, for example.  Another example is the use of the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis and fraud-on-the-market theory. 
197 This may be due to a perceived need to protect the investing public, a need that was 
apparently on the minds of members of Congress, as well as on the minds of the investing 
public, following the recent accounting frauds. 
198 See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
199 See Mills, supra note 83, at 489. 
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informed appraisal of management’s ability and integrity” in In re 
Franchard.200 
In Franchard, the SEC considered two main factors: its own powers 
under the Securities Act and practicalities of administering the Exchange 
Act.  The SEC distinguished directors’ due diligence in the preparation of 
SEC filings (in this case a registration statement as required by Section 11 
of the Securities Act) versus directors’ due care in the “ordinary 
operations of business enterprises[.]”201  The SEC asserted that diligence 
exercised in the former context is evaluated under federal securities law; 
diligence exercised in the latter context is evaluated under state statutory 
and common law of corporate fiduciary duty.202  Moreover, “[t]he 
[Securities] Act does not purport[] . . . to define Federal standards of 
directors’ responsibility in the ordinary operations of business 
enterprises[,]” and the SEC has no power to “formulate administratively 
such regulatory standards.”203  In other words, state law, not federal 
securities law, determines standards of director behavior in conducting 
ordinary business operations. 
Furthermore, to require routine disclosures as to whether or not the 
directors performed their state law fiduciary duties also would require 
the SEC to determine whether an assertion that directors complied with 
their state law fiduciary duties was a material truth or a material 
misrepresentation.  This would require the SEC to undertake its own 
evaluation of whether the directors met their duty of care.  Whether or 
not directors have met their duties varies given the complexity and type 
of business decision.  Due to this complexity, courts are loathe to 
interfere with directors’ business judgments and to find that the directors 
should be liable for breach of due care.  Similarly, the SEC was reluctant 
to take on the administrative burden of determining rights and liabilities 
for state law breach of fiduciary duty claims. 
Although the SEC expressed reluctance to determine whether 
directors acted as careful fiduciaries, it did leave the door open to make 
such determinations.  Because the Court may be guided by an 
administrative agency’s own interpretations of its powers, the Court may 
grant deference to the SEC on this issue. 
 
200 In re Franchard Corporation, No. 4710, 1964 WL 67454, at *5 (July 31, 1964). 
201 Id. at *9. 
202 Id. at *8. 
203 Id. at *9. 
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Congress granted the SEC’s Division of Enforcement additional 
resources in SOA,204 indicating that Congress intended that the SEC take 
an expanded role in enforcing federal law against accounting fraud.205 
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed whether a claim by minority 
shareholders alleging an inadequate price for their shares in a cash-out 
merger stated a claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.206  The 
Court stated that Section 10(b) was meant to reach manipulative and 
deceptive conduct.  Because the complaint did not allege a material 
misrepresentation or omission in connection with the merger transaction, 
the Court held that the complaint fell outside of the scope of Section 
10(b).  Moreover, the court cautioned that the claim that the merger 
resulted in an unfair price to the minority shareholders was typically a 
matter for state courts to decide and declined to extend the scope of Rule 
10b-5 to cover situations where shareholders were dissatisfied with share 
price, but no deceit was involved.  The Court declined to take that step 
absent clear congressional intent to federalize state law governing 
director responsibilities. 
In spite of the broad language in Santa Fe v. Green, and arguments 
based on that language that there is no federal common law cause of 
action for breach of fiduciary duty after Santa Fe, the principles 
enunciated by the Court should not exclude federal liability if directors 
fail in their duties and a violation of Section 10(b) results.  It is more 
precise to note that the Court stated that Congress did not intend to 
regulate acts which “constitute no more than internal corporate 
mismanagement[.]”207  The federal proceedings based on failure to 
monitor and oversee involve fraud and knowledge of fraud; more than 
internal corporate mismanagement is at issue. 
Santa Fe does not address the issues raised by the Chancellor case.  
Therefore, the Court once again may be called on to interpret the reach of 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.  However, the Supreme Court might not 
grant certiorari in such a case.  The Court has had opportunities to resolve 
 
204 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7504-7266, 78o-6, 78d-3, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1348-1350, 1514A, 1519-1520 (Supp. 2006). 
205 SOA tracks very closely to Enron fraud, but does not create new penalties or sanctions 
against failure to oversee.  See supra note 189 and accompanying text. 
206 See Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
207 Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478. 
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a split among the Circuits with regard to the level of scienter required 
under Rule 10b-5.208  Nonetheless, the Court has declined to do so. 
B. The Burden of Proof 
The burden of proof has two definitions:  (1) the burden to produce 
enough evidence to satisfy the fact finder of a particular fact in issue and 
(2) persuading the fact finder that the alleged fact is true.209  The second 
definition is sometimes known as the burden of persuasion.  The SEC 
bears the burden of persuasion on the underlying violation, on the 
question of unfitness, and on whether a temporary or permanent bar 
order is the appropriate remedy. 
The standard of proof alerts the fact finder as to who bears what 
proportion of the risk of a mistaken judgment—plaintiff or defendant.  
Three standards of proof may apply—preponderance of the evidence, 
clear and convincing evidence, and evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.  
A preponderance of the evidence is the appropriate burden of 
persuasion for SEC bar actions in both administrative proceedings and in 
federal court actions, for at least two reasons.  First, “the term 
‘unfitness[]’ was intended to suggest a lower standard of proof than the 
previous standard under the Remedies Act.”210  The change from the 
“substantial unfitness” standard to an “unfitness” standard was 
intended to lower the SEC’s burden of persuasion.  Finally, the change in 
standard may be seen as a message to courts to impose bars in cases of 
egregious conduct and that a finding of the likelihood of future 
misconduct is not the factor that should carry the most weight.  
Secondly, preponderance is the standard most often imposed in civil 
proceedings, in private plaintiff Section 10(b) lawsuits, and in 
administrative proceedings to bar regulated professionals. 
 
208 Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1090 n.5 (1991). 
209 C. J. Cuevas, Rule 10b-5 and Burdens of Persuasion: A Preponderance is Enough, 12 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 495, 510 n.92 (1983). 
210 Barnard, supra note 78, at 20; see also S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27 (2002). 
The Commission has argued that the ‘substantial unfitness’ standard 
for imposing bars is inordinately high, causing courts to refrain from 
imposing bars even in cases of egregious misconduct.  The proposed 
bill rectifies this deficiency by modifying the standard governing 
imposition of officer and director bars from ‘substantial unfitness’ to 
‘unfitness.’ 
S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 27; see also supra note 11. 
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C. Providing Proper Directorial Incentives 
Another set of challenges arises from the practical and political 
implications of such lawsuits.  First, as a matter of law, directors are not 
expected to know (and as a practical matter are not likely to know) the 
detailed workings of a large corporation.  Regulation, whether by formal 
rulemaking or by reports, and administrative and civil proceedings must 
not chill interested and qualified persons from serving as non-
management directors on corporate boards, but must provide a restraint 
on less circumspect corporate behavior.  Whereas the SEC may be able to 
recognize reckless ignorance of accounting fraud when it sees it, non-
management directors may not know how much they should know 
about corporate financial information and the decisions that produce 
such information from raw data.  Regulation should encourage corporate 
boards, and especially non-management directors, to continue the best 
practices catalyzed by SOA. 
A growing wave of criticism of SOA provisions by corporations and 
legislatures indicates a backlash against federal regulation of corporate 
governance.  Although SOA has always had its critics, more critics have 
become more vocal.  Such critics argue that SOA was an inappropriate 
and inefficient response, and that SOA has harmed more than it has 
served to benefit the economy.  Regardless of one’s views as to the merits 
of that argument, it remains true that Congress’s reaction was swift, and 
that corporate officials were concerned with the potential liability 
created by many of SOA’s provisions.  Some officials reacted by leaving 
their positions.  Potential corporate directors have refused to take 
directorial positions because of concerns about future liability, while 
others face an increased due diligence burden in deciding whether they 
would accept positions on corporate boards.  Director and officer 
liability insurance costs have reached a high not seen since the Delaware 
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom defined a standard of 
personal liability for corporate directors that exposed directors to 
liability for behavior formerly seen as meeting the legal standard of due 
care.  In the current atmosphere of uncertainty, additional concerns are 
raised if the SEC increases its enforcement efforts against non-
management directors.  Such concerns include whether the SEC would 
exercise its prosecutorial discretion to bring administrative proceedings 
and civil suits against directors who thought their behavior met the 
standard of care under state law. 
However, the recent cases reveal a trend toward holding directors 
accountable for behavior that likely would breach state fiduciary duties 
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as well as amount to federal securities fraud.  Even directors who are 
unsure of what conduct satisfies state fiduciary duties (at a minimum) 
and of what exemplifies best practices would know that falsifying 
documents constitutes fraud.  Audit committee members should realize 
that they have a responsibility to investigate red flags raised by outside 
auditors, under both state and federal law.  Directors are not required to 
know the details of daily operations (micro-monitoring) in order to avoid 
liability.  Further, the SEC has indicated that a hands-off approach in the 
face of known red flags (under monitoring) may lead to liability. 
D. Is the SEC Fit to Serve in this Watchdog Role? 
One recent article noted that “Sarbanes-Oxley arguably fills the 
statutory gap left by the 1933 and 1934 Acts, which may not have 
provided enough of a statutory basis for the SEC to pursue directors who 
breached their fiduciary duties.”211  In this regard, SOA may indicate 
Congress’s intent to empower the SEC to bring administrative and civil 
court proceedings to bar officers and directors from serving in such 
capacities in publicly-traded companies.212 
Indeed, SOA falls short of its real potential to enforce standards of 
director care at the federal level.  However, this shortcoming may reflect 
Congress’s desire (influenced by the SEC) to defer to the SEC to curtail 
accounting fraud.  In the past, the SEC has expressed a reluctance to 
bring actions against directors, particularly non-management directors, 
for failure to monitor and investigate.  However, to the extent that lack of 
resources and enforcement options thwarted the SEC’s enforcement 
efforts, SOA mitigates the problems to a degree.  Congress gave the SEC 
more resources to do its job and provided enhanced enforcement 
remedies to aid the SEC in its enforcement efforts.  Also, the SEC has 
additional support from the enhanced monitoring function of other 
watchdogs, particularly outside accounting firms.  For example, outside 
accounting firms uncovered and alerted the SEC to the accounting 
frauds at Chancellor, Del Global, and Candie’s.213 
Should the SEC prove to be an ineffective watchdog, others, such as 
state courts and outside auditors, may provide more vigorous checks on 
accounting fraud.  Finally, some commentators have suggested that 
Congress can step in and amend SOA to include a federal fiduciary duty 
 
211 See Mills, supra note 83, at 486 (citing Peloso & Indek, supra note 190, at 3). 
212 See Mills, supra note 83, at 487.  In addition, the standard in Sarbanes-Oxley is 
unfitness, as opposed to the substantial unfitness standard.  See supra note 11. 
213 See Sale, supra note 21, at 1402. 
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rule, should the SEC prove to be an ineffective watchdog.  Of course, the 
political will may be absent in Congress in any given election year, given 
that a series of financial frauds and accounting meltdowns the size of 
Enron, WorldCom, and Waste Management has not occurred since the 
beginning of this century. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Corporate governance flaws of the kind identified in this article are 
not a new phenomenon.214  Recent scandals involving widespread 
backdating of options for both management and non-management 
directors, pretexting, and accounting fraud indicate that the monitoring 
and oversight failures present at the beginning of this century still exist 
and are likely as pervasive as they were at that time.215  Further, recent 
federal regulation, including SOA and the stock exchange listing rules, 
does not create new civil or criminal liabilities for corporate directors, 
with a few exceptions.216  Chief executive officers and chief financial 
officers, who are also likely to be directors, do face additional, express 
requirements to certify the truth and accuracy of financial statements 
filed with the SEC.217  However, various legal theories existed prior to 
SOA under which corporate officers may have been found liable for 
knowingly signing false financial statements.218  Furthermore, not every 
corporate director must sign SEC filings.  Under SOA, non-management 
directors do not face express, new liability for failure to monitor and 
oversee corporate activities.  In that sense, SOA failed to take the step 
 
214 This is not a case of “if it is not broken, do not fix it.” 
215 Enron and WorldCom have come to epitomize financial and accounting fraud and the 
lack of director perception of that fraud, in part due to director inattention.  See generally 
supra notes 26, 105 and accompanying text.  Hewlett-Packard has become the “poster child” 
to illustrate pretexting—an investigative practice involving gathering confidential 
information through the use of invented stories.  See House Panel Digs Deep in HP Spy Case, 
WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2006.  Hewlett-Packard’s former board chair, Patricia Dunn, former 
general counsel Ann Baskins, and former chief ethics officer Kevin Hunsacker resigned 
after it was revealed that they had used pretexting to determine the source of a board leak 
of confidential information regarding Hewlett-Packard’s long-term strategic plans.  Id.  
(The source was Hewlett-Pakard board member George Keyworth.)  Whole Foods and the 
SEC are investigating Whole Foods’s Chief Executive Officer John Mackey’s anonymous 
internet postings attacking rival Wild Oats as a “bad business not worth its stock price.”  
See Whole Foods CEO’s Anonymous Online Life, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19718742/.  Whole Foods later attempted to purchase 
Wild Oats.  Id.  In time, HP and Whole Foods’s behaviors may come to be seen as hubris, 
underestimation of risk, overconfidence, or another type of cognitive bias. 
216 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
218 See generally Fairfax, supra note 25. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 [2008], Art. 2
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/2
2008] "Unfit to Serve" Post Enron 1127 
that would provide a more direct route to liability for failure to oversee 
corporate operations. 
Courts and the SEC “should approach the question of ‘unfitness’ 
guided by principle and with humility.”219  But more importantly, courts 
and the SEC should recognize that accounting and financial fraud 
threaten the public welfare.220  To the extent that courts have been 
reluctant to impose prospective bars, they also should keep in mind that 
Congress lowered the unfitness bar to facilitate “the SEC’s prevention of 
individuals who have violated the securities laws from serving as 
officers and directors[]” and to “reflect the President’s recommendation 
that ‘CEOs or other officers who clearly abuse their power should lose 
their right to serve in any corporate leadership positions.’”221  Only 
egregious failure to heed red flags should give rise to civil monetary 
liability in the new regime.222   Cases involving management ignorance of 
“flagrant misdeeds, management self-interest[,] and repeated red 
flags[]”223 provide a sound model for future SEC enforcement actions 
and bar remedies. 
 
219 See Barnard, supra note 78, at 13. 
220 See Justin Toby McDonald, An Historical Perspective to the Corporate Bar Provisions of the 
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
987, 1021 (1992). 
221 S. REP. NO. 107-205, at 26-27 (2002). 
222 See Mills, supra note 83, at 492 (“At present[,] [federal regulators] are able to develop a 
federal fiduciary duty standard on an ad hoc basis, selecting egregious cases that tend to 
result in a standard that is both flexible and harsh.”). 
223 See Mills, supra note 83, at 495. 
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